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Articles
The Antitrust Analysis of Network
Joint Ventures
by
THOMAS A. PmArNo, JR.*
I. The Antitrust Problems of Network Joint Ventures
This Article explains the current confusion in the federal courts'
antitrust analysis of network joint ventures and proposes a means by
which that confusion may be resolved. A new judicial approach is par-
ticularly important because networks are critical to the operation of
many markets today. The credit card, Automatic Teller Machine
("ATM"), on-line computer, telecommunications and electronic bank-
ing services enjoyed by Americans today could not be provided with-
out sophisticated electronic networks. Advances in semiconductor
technology make it possible for such networks to increase both their
processing speed and capacity. Now, more users can be linked through
networks that complete transactions within shorter periods of time
than ever before. Firms in many markets are taking advantage of this
new technology by forming joint ventures to operate industry-wide
networks.1 Both Congress and the federal courts are struggling to
adapt the federal antitrust and regulatory framework to this new elec-
tronic world. Congress is considering a telecommunications bill that
* Vice President-Law, Parker-Hannifin Corporation, Cleveland, Ohio; B.A., Alle-
gheny College, 1971; J.D., Cornell Law School, 1974. The opinions expressed in this Article
are personal to the author and do not reflect the opinions of Parker-Hannifin Corporation.
1. For example, VISA, MasterCard, and Microsoft recently announced a joint ven-
ture to establish an industry-wide standard for electronic credit card transactions. Saul
Hansell, Credit Cards on Internet Given a Lift N.Y. Tihms, June 24, 1995, at 35. AT&T,
General Instrument, Phillips Consumer Electronics, and Zenith Corporation have formed
a joint venture to develop "high definition" digital television. Edmund L. Andrews & Joel
Brinkley, The Fight for Digital TV's Future, N.Y. TmrMS, Jan. 22, 1995, § 3, at 1, 6. A joint
venture between Time-Warner and U.S. West will provide cable television services and
programs. See Laura Landro et al., Cable-Phone Link Is Promising Gamble: Time Warner
Sees Synergy in Partnership, WALL ST. J., May 18, 1993, at B1.
would deregulate many of the markets currently dominated by elec-
tronic networks.2 The courts are trying to apply the "essential facili-
ties" doctrine, developed by the judiciary before the advent of
electronics, to the membership rules of these new network joint
ventures.3
The first cases defining the essential facilities doctrine were de-
cided during the first half of this century. At that time, physical net-
works were predominant as the United States built an infrastructure
of fixed assets. Railroads conducted traffic at commonly owned facili-
ties and utilities constructed transmission wires and pipelines to de-
liver electricity, oil, and natural gas to customers throughout the
country.4 In recent years, electronic networks have supplanted many
physical networks in economic power and prominence. Companies
such as Microsoft, AT&T, the Baby Bells, IBM and Apple are build-
ing software to connect televisions, personal computers, and other de-
vices to high speed electronic networks. 5 The National Information
Infrastructure (often called the "Information Superhighway") makes
innovations such as electronic mail and on-line home banking and
shopping possible. 6
Like railroads in the late nineteenth century and interstate high-
ways in the mid-twentieth, electronic networks have become critical
facilities to which firms must have access in order to reach certain
markets. The new network joint ventures pose a critical dilemma to
Congress and the courts. On the one hand, consumer welfare, the
main objective of antitrust regulation,7 is promoted by these joint ven-
2. See Daniel Pearl, Senate, in 81-18 Vote, Clears Overhaul of the Nation's Communi-
cations Law, WALL ST. J., June 16, 1995, at A3. The Bill permits the seven regional Bell
companies to sell long-distance telephone services in competition with AT&T, MCI, and
Sprint, allows cable and local telephone companies to compete with each other, and lets
electric utilities compete in local telecommunications markets. Id.
3. See infra notes 28-60 and accompanying text.
4. Donald I. Baker, Compulsory Access to Network Joint Ventures Under the Sher-
man Act. Rules or Roulette?, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 999, 1006-07.
5. Bill Gates, They're Talking, We're Selling, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 1995, at A22.
6. See Ilene Knable Gotts & Alan D. Rutenberg, Detours on the Information Super-
highway: Legal and Regulatory Issues to be Addressed, Paper presented to the 43d Annual
Spring Meeting of the American Bar Association Antitrust Section 1-2 (Apr. 6, 1995) (on
file with author).
7. In several recent cases, the federal courts make it clear that the goal of the anti-
trust laws is to enhance consumer welfare by ensuring competitive markets that provide
consumers with the maximum possible output of goods and services at the lowest possible
prices. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979); Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979); Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d
742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 228
(D.C. Cir. 1986); see also Robert Bork, The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics, 54
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tures which make new products and services available to American
consumers. On the other hand, network joint ventures have achieved
monopoly power in many markets because of their technological su-
periority. Monopolies, of course, are anathema to antitrust regulators
because they tend ultimately to exact higher prices and reduce out-
put.8 Network monopolies can have a particularly pernicious effect on
competition because they constitute gateways through which a firm
must pass before it can enter the relevant market. By denying access
to particular firms, networks can completely exclude those firms from
a market, thereby retaining monopoly power over prices and output.
In recent years, several network joint ventures have used their
monopoly power to exclude aggressive and innovative rivals from the
marketplace. Real estate multiple listing services have excluded bro-
kers who charged commissions below the prevailing rate;9 the VISA
credit card system denied Sears the opportunity to issue a lower-cost
version of the VISA credit card;10 and professional sports leagues
have artificially reduced the number of available franchises so that
they can continue to exact monopoly profits from local municipalities
and sports fans."
Courts have found it difficult to balance the beneficial and ad-
verse competitive effects of network joint ventures. Indeed, the stan-
dards used by courts in their antitrust analysis of networks have
generally been inadequate. Traditionally, courts have analyzed agree-
ments among joint venture partners to determine whether they consti-
tute a "contract, combination.., or conspiracy, in restraint of trade"
in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.12 Courts have viewed
such agreements among competitors to exclude third parties from
their markets as illegal "group boycotts" under section 1. Indeed,
group boycotts have been classified as a type of conduct so pernicious
ANrrrrusr LJ. 21, 24 (1985) (arguing that courts must be guided solely by the need to
protect consumer welfare).
8. For example, in the cable television area, fewer than one per cent of cable systems
currently face significant competition in their local markets. Studies by the Federal Com-
munications Commission in 1993 indicated that cable systems with local monopoly power
charged, on average, thirty per cent more than the handful of systems that had competi-
tors. See Edmund L. Andrews, From Communications Chaos, Order?, N.Y. Tircms, June 17,
1995, §1, at 1, 36.
9. See United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1371 (5th Cir. 1980).
10. See SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 956, 964 (D. Utah 1993),
rev'd, 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2600 (1995) ("VISA P).
11. See infra notes 220-24 and accompanying text.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
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that it should be deemed per se illegal on its face.13 Under the per se
rule, courts have refused to consider any justifications offered by de-
fendants or any market conditions that might mitigate the adverse
competitive effects of group boycotts. 14 Once a court classifies an
agreement among competitors as a group boycott, it will decline any
further consideration and summarily find the agreement illegal.15
In recent years, courts have become confused in applying the
group boycott doctrine. Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that
"[t]here is more confusion about the scope and operation of the per se
rule against group boycotts than in reference to any other aspect of
the per se doctrine. 1 6 This confusion has been compounded by the
fact that courts have begun to apply the "rule of reason" with increas-
ing frequency in section 1 cases. Under the rule of reason, courts ex-
amine all of the circumstances surrounding a particular restraint of
trade, and in particular the parties' market power, before determining
its legality.17 During the last two decades, antitrust law has become
more integrated with and influenced by economic theory. As courts
have become more attuned to the importance of economics, they have
become more likely to use a rule of reason rather than a strict per se
approach.18
However, the increased use of the rule of reason has exacted a
heavy cost in terms of legal certainty and judicial efficiency. It is now
difficult to predict whether a court will apply a rule of reason or per se
approach to particular conduct. Furthermore, under the rule of rea-
son, antitrust cases are much more complex and their outcome is more
uncertain. 19 Instead of deciding the legality of the conduct on its face
under a per se approach, the rule of reason requires that a court con-
sider the market impact of the conduct as well as any justifications
13. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656,
660 (1961) (per se illegality of denial of seal of approval from industry association); Associ-
ated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 12 (1945) (per se illegality of Associated Press's
prohibition of sale of news stories to non-members).
14. See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 436 (1990)
(holding that per se rule should apply to group boycotts even in absence of any proof of
the defendants' market power).
15. See cases cited supra note 13.
16. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284, 294 (1985) ("Northwest Stationers") (quoting LAWRENCE A. SuLLIVAN, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 83, at 229-30 (1977)).
17. As the court recently stated, "[a]n essential element of every rule of reason claim
is a showing that the defendants exercised market power in some relevant market." Ad-
damax Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc., 888 F. Supp 274, 283 (D. Mass. 1995).
18. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 62-105 and accompanying text.
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advanced by the defendants. 20 To date, courts have not been able to
devise an effective method of analyzing network access restrictions
under the rule of reason.21 As a result, businesses have become con-
fused about the antitrust standards for network access. This uncer-
tainty has deterred the formation of networks that could create new
products and services for consumers.
This Article proposes a new antitrust approach that would clarify
the standards for judging network access restrictions. Modem network
joint ventures enhance consumer welfare. Because of their economic
efficiencies, such joint ventures should not be prohibited under the
antitrust laws, even when they hold monopoly power. It would do
more harm than good to break up many network monopolies. Indeed,
it is often the monopoly power of networks that makes them so
efficient.23
Although network joint ventures should not be per se illegal, they
also should not be free from regulation under the antitrust laws. In-
deed, the monopoly power of many modem networks makes antitrust
regulation essential.24 Such networks act as gateways through which a
new entrant must pass in order to enter a particular market.25 As long
as a network constitutes a critical path to the relevant market, it
should not be permitted to deny entry to qualified firms. Antitrust
enforcement must ensure that the network gatekeepers permit access
to the relevant market, on equal terms, to all parties who are capable
of participating in that market.26
20. See infra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 77-105 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 110-112 and accompanying text.
24. The pending deregulation of telecommunications markets will make it possible for
firms to obtain even broader network monopolies in those markets. One firm in a particu-
lar city, for example, could conceivably own each of the television and radio stations, cable
systems, and newspapers, thus controlling all of the local media outlets. See Andrews,
supra note 8, at 36. Under such circumstances, appropriate antitrust regulation will become
even more essential.
25. The relevant gateway may be a telephone line, on-line network, pipeline, or a
software program.
26. The concept of open access to an essential network has been recognized in various
regulatory areas outside the antitrust field. The 1992 Cable Act prohibits cable companies
from denying "fair access" to their programs by competing delivery systems, such as direct
broadcast satellites. 47 U.S.C. § 548(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1994). The Clinton Administration
has proposed regulations to ensure universal access to the Internet. See Knable & Gotts,
supra note 6, at 3. The new telecommunications bill pending in Congress requires local
telephone companies to allow their rivals to interconnect with their phone systems so that
competing companies are able to link calls between each other's customers. See Edmund
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The new approach proposed in this Article provides an effective
means by which the judiciary can regulate access to network joint ven-
tures. This approach is neither a traditional per se nor a rule of reason
standard. The proposed approach relies on presumptions and burdens
of proof to simplify the courts' analysis. Instead of the complex mar-
ket power inquiry required by the rule of reason, courts will be able to
focus on a few easily determinable factors that will be decisive in their
analysis. Under this approach, the party seeking access to an existing
network joint venture must rebut an initial presumption that open ac-
cess need not be compelled. The excluded party can only rebut the
presumption by proving that "but for" access to the network, it would
be unable to compete effectively in the relevant market. If the ex-
cluded party is successful in rebutting this presumption, the burden
shifts to members of the network to justify any restrictions on access
that are imposed by the venture. Network members must then demon-
strate that such restrictions are necessary to promote the efficiency of
the venture. This approach protects the property rights of the network
members while ensuring open access in those cases where it is neces-
sary to preserve competition in the market served by the network.
Adoption of this approach would simplify the courts' antitrust analysis
of network joint ventures, thus conserving judicial resources and giv-
ing businesses better guidance on the antitrust standards for network
access.
I. Precedent for Compelled Network Access: The Essential
Facilities Doctrine
The "essential facilities" doctrine has a long history in antitrust
law. The doctrine arose out of the courts' recognition that certain as-
sets are so critical to effective competition in a relevant market that all
qualified parties should be allowed access to such assets on equal
terms. Under this precedent, essential networks have been required to
maintain open membership policies. This affirmative obligation is sim-
ilar to the "duty to deal," which courts have imposed on monopolists
in cases brought under section 2 of the Sherman Act.27
L. Andrews, Senate Approves Far-Reaching Bill on Media Industry, N.Y. Tirms, June 16,
1995, at Al, D4; Andrews, supra note 8, at 36.
27. Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization and attempts to monopo-
lize. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
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A. Monopolists' Duty to Deal Under Section 2
Courts have acknowledged that, in general, a business has no
legal obligation to deal with third parties; it can deal, or refuse to deal,
with whomever it chooses.28 However, courts have also determined
that the right to refuse to deal is not unqualified.29 The antitrust laws
impose an affirmative duty to deal on monopolists because of their
special position in the relevant market. A monopolist cannot refuse to
deal with its competitors in a way that unreasonably excludes them
from the monopolized market.3 0 Thus, in several cases, the Supreme
Court has required monopolists to deal with all interested parties on
nondiscriminatory terms.
In Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,31 the Supreme Court
held that an electrical company's refusal to sell electric power in the
wholesale market to municipalities that operated their own retail dis-
tribution systems violated section 2 of the Sherman Act. Lorain Jour-
nal Co. v. United States32 involved the refusal by the publisher of the
only newspaper in Lorain, Ohio to sell advertising to parties who pa-
tronized a local radio station. The publisher argued that it had the
right to refuse to accept advertisements from whomever it pleased.33
The Court, however, held that this right was qualified and found that
the publisher's refusal to deal was an illegal attempt to monopolize
the mass dissemination of news and advertising in the local area.34
Finally, in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,35 de-
fendant, who controlled three of the four skiing mountains in the
Aspen area, refused to cooperate with the owner of the fourth moun-
tain in marketing a multi-day, multi-mountain ski ticket.3 6 The Tenth
Circuit characterized the special ticket as an "essential facility, '37 and
the Supreme Court affirmed the verdict, which found that the defend-
ant violated section 2 by refusing to cooperate in the issuance of the
ticket.38
28. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 601 (1985)
(quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rigle Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984)).
29. Id.
30. See PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANrriusT LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTTrrRUsT PRiNciPLrs AND THEm APPLICATION 728b4, at 231 (1978).
31. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
32. 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 149.
35. 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir. 1984), affda 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
36. Id. at 1512-13.
37. Id. at 1520-21.
38. 472 U.S. at 605-11.
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The lower federal courts have also found a duty to deal under
section 2 when a monopolist controls a facility to which access is nec-
essary in order to compete. In MCI Communications Corp. v.
AT&T, 39 the Seventh Circuit affirmed an order directing AT&T to
allow MCI to interconnect its long distance lines with the local Bell
telephone facilities, which, at that time, were still owned by AT&T.
Delaware & Hudson Railway Co. v. Consolidated Rail Corp.40 in-
volved a railroad that wanted to ship newsprint from Eastern Canada
to the mid-Atlantic states.41 The product could not reach its destina-
tion without passing over Conrail's tracks.42 Pointing out that physical
duplication of Conrail's tracks would be impractical and inefficient,
the Second Circuit found that Conrail may have violated section 2 in
demanding an 800% price increase for the use of the tracks.43
B. The Section 1 Essential Facilities Cases
The essential facilities cases brought under section 1 of the Sher-
man Act involve joint ventures to which third parties have sought ac-
cess in order to compete in the relevant market. The issue in such
cases has been whether the members of a joint venture illegally con-
spired among themselves to deny third parties the right to participate
in the venture. 44 In the essential facility cases, courts have had to con-
sider the antitrust implications of multi-firm conspiracies rather than
the single-firm conduct at issue in the section 2 monopolization cases.
The results, however, have been similar. As in the section 2 cases,
courts have imposed a duty to deal on joint ventures that control facil-
ities essential for effective competition in the relevant market.45 In-
deed, once the courts have found a joint venture to be essential, they
have traditionally deemed its members' refusal to deal to be a per se
illegal group boycott.46
The first, and perhaps the most influential, section 1 essential fa-
cilities case was United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n,47 which was
decided by the Supreme Court in 1912. Fourteen railroads jointly
39. 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
40. 902 F.2d 174 (2d Cir. 1990).
41. Id. at 176.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 177, 179-80.
44. See infra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
45. See United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 411 (1912).
46. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656,
659-60 (1961).
47. 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
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owned the Terminal Railroad Association. The Association controlled
the only means of access across the Mississippi River to the city of St.
Louis (two bridges and a car ferry). No railroad could access St. Louis,
then a major railroad hub, from the east without using the Associa-
tion's facilities. The cost for competitors to acquire similar means of
access was prohibitive. Although the Government sought dissolution
of the Association, the Court did not opt for such a severe remedy.
Instead, the Court required that the Association allow all other rail-
roads to use the bridges and ferry "upon such just and reasonable
terms as shall place such applying company upon a plane of equality
in respect of benefits and burdens with the present proprietary
companies." 48
Other Supreme Court cases have followed Terminal Railroad
Ass'n in compelling access to joint venture facilities that are essential
for effective competition in the relevant market. In Silver v. New York
Stock Exchange,49 the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") disap-
proved a broker-dealer's application for connection to a prirate wire
system among stock exchange members.5 0 The wire permitted brokers
to receive "instantaneously available" market information and to
trade with other brokers in the market.51 The Court concluded that
"[t]he concerted action of the Exchange and its members here was, in
simple terms, a group boycott depriving petitioners of a valuable busi-
ness service which they needed in order to compete effectively as bro-
ker-dealers in the over-the-counter securities market."52 Similarly,
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.53 concerned
the refusal of an industry-wide standards-setting organization to pro-
vide its "seal of approval" to plaintiff's gas burner.5 4 The burner was
not approved despite its apparent safety and efficiency. Without the
seal of approval, the plaintiff was effectively excluded from the mar-
ket. The Court characterized the association's conduct as a group boy-
cott and applied the per se rule.55
The railroad association in Terminal Railroad Ass'n, the NYSE in
Silver, and the standards-setting organization in Radiant Burners all
had monopoly control over the means of access to the markets that
48. Id. at 411-12.
49. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
50. Id. at 344.
51. Id. at 348.
52. Id. at 347.
53. 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
54. Id. at 658.
55. Id. at 659-60.
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they served. However, in certain cases, courts have required open ac-
cess to a joint venture facility where the venture did not constitute a
monopoly and potential entrants had other alternatives by which to
enter the relevant market. For example, in Associated Press v. United
States,56 the Supreme Court compelled open access to the Associated
Press ("AP") wire service. At the time of the suit, the AP was a joint
venture that included 1200 newspaper publishers as members.57 The
association's bylaws allowed a member newspaper to veto the admis-
sion of another nonmember newspaper operating in the same city and
field (morning, evening, or Sunday).58 The AP competed with United
Press and International News Service in providing wire service news.59
Although the AP was not the only means through which newspapers
could obtain such news, the Supreme Court voided the bylaw provi-
sion that allowed members to veto the admission of competitors. 60
C. Descent into Confusion: The Current Rule of Reason Approach
Recently, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have
moved away from the per se approach to joint venture access restric-
tions. Courts are beginning to use the rule of reason more frequently
to analyze collective refusals by a group of firms to deal with their
competitors. 61 The effect of this trend has been to inject greater uncer-
tainty into this area of antitrust law. The trend began with the
Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc.
v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.62 ("Northwest Stationers"). Plain-
tiff claimed that its expulsion from a joint buying cooperative of one
hundred office supply retailers constituted a per se illegal group boy-
56. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
57. Id. at 3-4.
58. Id. at 4.
59. Id. at 13.
60. Id. at 21.
61. The greater use of the rule of reason coincided with the federal courts' increased
receptivity to economic arguments in antitrust cases. Beginning in the late 1970s, the fed-
eral courts began to emphasize the economic over the populist goals of antitrust. Relying
on the writings of the "Chicago School" of academic commentators, many of whom were
appointed to the federal bench, several courts concluded that antitrust enforcement should
be aimed at guaranteeing consumer welfare through lower prices and enhanced output
rather than at such populist goals as the protection of small dealers or the fairness of the
competitive process. See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210,
228 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters.,
Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985); Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678
F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982).
62. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
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cott.63 The buying cooperative generated several efficiencies including
economies of scale in purchasing and warehousing and ready access to
inventoryfra Given such potential beneficial effects, the Court con-
cluded that a rule of reason, rather than a per se approach, was most
appropriate. 65 However, in remanding the case, the Court provided
little guidance on how the rule of reason analysis should be carried
out. The Court simply stated that, "[w]hen the plaintiff challenges ex-
pulsion from a joint buying cooperative, some showing must be made
that the cooperative possesses market power or unique access to a
business element necessary for effective competition. ' 66
In the term following Northwest Stationers, the Court continued
to emphasize the plaintiff's need to prove market power in group boy-
cott cases. Federal Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Den-
tists67 involved an association of dentists who refused to supply patient
x-rays to insurance companies seeking to evaluate benefit claims.68
Although ultimately finding this practice illegal under the rule of rea-
son, the Court declined "to resolve this case by forcing the Federa-
tion's policy into the 'boycott' pigeonhole and invoking the per se
rule. ' 69 The Court concluded that the per se rule should be "limited to
cases in which firms with market power boycott suppliers or custom-
ers in order to discourage them from doing business with a
competitor. '70
Neither Northwest Stationers nor Indiana Federation of Dentists
resolved the question of what role, if any, the per se rule should play
in the analysis of joint venture access restrictions. Are there circum-
stances under which the denial of access to a facility controlled by a
joint venture should be illegal on its face? Or is the fuller analysis
required by the rule of reason always appropriate? The distinction be-
tween the per se and rule of reason approaches is critical because,
traditionally, the outcome of a case has turned on the approach cho-
sen by the court. Generally, application of the rule of reason has
63. Id. at 285.
64. Id. at 295.
65. 1& at 295-98.
66. Id. at 298.
67. 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
68. Id, at 451.
69. Id at 458.
70. Id-
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meant a decision for the defendant, and application of the per se rule,
a victory for the plaintiff.71
Increased application of the rule of reason to joint venture access
restrictions is likely to lead to longer, more complicated trials and
more ambiguous outcomes. The classic formulation of the rule of rea-
son, set forth by Justice Brandeis in 1918, includes a long list of factors
that might conceivably reveal the purpose or effect of a section 1
agreement, but it assigns no priority or weight to any particular fac-
tor.72 Later Supreme Court cases failed to refine this open-ended
formula. In Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,73 for exam-
ple, the Court cited Justice Brandies' formulation without any indica-
tion of the weight to be afforded certain factors.74 Similarly, in
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.75 the Court sim-
ply cited GTE Sylvania's broad definition without any further
explanation.76
In the absence of any guidance on the relative weight to be given
to the various factors of its open-ended formula, the rule of reason has
lost most of its utility in antitrust analysis. Indeed, the confusion gen-
erated by the approach is currently "one of the more vexing problems
of antitrust law."77 The checklist approach puts so many factors at is-
sue that none is dispositive.78 The absence of clear standards makes it
difficult to predict the outcome of particular cases. The only certainty
under the rule of reason is that courts will be required to engage in a
71. Donald L. Beschle, "What, Never? Well Hardly Ever": Strict Antitrust Scrutiny As
an Alternative to Per Se Antitrust Illegality, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 501-02 (1987); Joe Sims,
Developments in Agreements Among Competitors, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 433, 435 (1989).
72. Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (considering such fac-
tors as circumstances peculiar to the defendant's business, conditions before and after the
restraint, the nature and purpose of the restraint, and the competitive effects of the
restraint).
73. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
74. Id. at 49-50 n.15.
75. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
76. Id. at 723. In 1992, the American Bar Association Antitrust Section concluded:
"[a]lthough the rule of reason has been part of Sherman Act jurisprudence for almost
eighty years, the specific analysis for determining whether particular restraints of trade
unreasonably restrict competition under this standard still is not clearly established."
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 41-
42 (1992).
77. David A. Clanton, Horizontal Agreements, the Rule of Reason and the General
Motors-Toyota Joint Venture, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1239, 1249 (1984).
78. Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 135, 153-55 (1984) ("A global inquiry invites no answer; it puts too many things
in issue .... Of course judges cannot do what such open-ended formulas require. When
everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive.").
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complicated and prolonged investigation into market impact before
determining the legality of a particular restraint. Determination of the
relevant market and the parties' market power is particularly burden-
some. Proof of market power is "difficult, complex, expensive and
time-consuming," 79 involving a fact-intensive assessment of the rele-
vant product and geographic markets, each party's shares of those
markets, and their competitors' market shares.
Defendants, as well as plaintiffs, incur greater costs in defending
cases under a standard that gives so few guidelines for judges and ju-
ries to follow. Both parties may be more inclined to prolong litigation
because of the rule of reason's uncertain outcome.80 The time and ex-
pense involved in rule of reason cases are an added burden on the
federal courts, which, with their current backlog of cases, can ill afford
to waste their limited resources. In addition, the traditional rule of
reason standard provides little guidance to firms in planning their con-
duct. Antitrust enforcement relies primarily on self-policing by the
business community, but voluntary compliance is impossible when an-
titrust standards are unclear. The "gray area" between permissible
and illegal conduct is much broader under the vague rule of reason
approach that has supplanted the per se rule for many types of group
boycotts. Given the high costs of litigation and potential liability
under the antitrust laws, businesses are likely to take a conservative
approach and avoid any conduct that falls within a gray area.81 Such
hesitancy may prevent firms from entering into network joint ventures
that enhance productivity and benefit consumers, consequences that
are ultimately harmful to society as a whole.82
79. Phillip Areeda, The Changing Contours of the Per Se Rule, 54 ANTrrRusT L.J. 27,
28(1985).
80. Maxwell M. Blecher, The "New Antitrust" As Seen by a Plaintiffs Lawyer, 54
Arrrsr LJ. 43, 45 (1985) ("The increased focus on case facts under the rule of reason
will ... increase the uncertainty involved in litigation, and this uncertainty will increase the
number of cases litigated because parties are unsure of what the outcome of a particular
case will be."); see also Easterbrook, supra note 78, at 155 ("Litigation costs are the prod-
uct of vague rules combined with high stakes, and nowhere is that combination more
deadly than in antitrust litigation under the rule of reason.").
81. One commentator has noted how antitrust law has moved from the clear stan-
dards of the past "into a gray area where it is possible for a case to come out one way-or
another." BEry BocK, Is AwrrrNusr DEAD? 10 (The Conference Board ed., 1989). An-
other commentator has reflected on the high cost to the business community resulting from
the confusion over antitrust standards: "[u]ncertainty is a high-cost commodity. Indeed, the
business community.., might find uncertainty more costly than clear and wrong rules."
Sims, supra note 71, at 440.
82. For example, many American firms have been deterred from entering into joint
ventures for the production of new products out of a fear of antitrust liability. See Thomas
Jorde & David Teece, Innovation, Cooperation and Antitrust, 4 HIGH TFCH. L.J. 1, 36
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One commentator has pointed out that the courts' current ap-
proach to joint venture access restrictions is "little more than a juris-
prudential bog."' 83 Recent cases in which courts have used the rule of
reason to analyze access restrictions confirm this view. Indeed, many
of these cases appear to reach inconsistent results. In United States v.
Realty Multi-List Inc.,84 the Fifth Circuit found a real estate multiple
listing service to be an essential facility and thus prohibited it from
adopting subjective membership rules that could be used to exclude
qualified entrants.85 Recently, however, in Montgomery County Ass'n
of Realtors, Inc. v. Realty Photo Master Corp.,86 a federal district court
reached the opposite conclusion in a similar case. Plaintiff sought ac-
cess to a real estate multiple listing service database to provide poten-
tial buyers with photographs of homes listed for sale.87 The court held
that plaintiff could not prevail under an essential facilities theory be-
cause it could not prove that it was impractical to duplicate the multi-
ple listing service. 88
The standard for analyzing network access restrictions has been
further confused by the recent rule of reason litigation concerning
credit card networks. In particular, cases have reached opposite con-
clusions on two critical issues: the method for defining the relevant
market and the standard for determining the parties' market power.
National Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc.89 ("NaBanco 1') in-
volved a suit by a third-party processor of credit card transactions that
alleged that an interchange fee charged by the VISA credit card sys-
tem to credit card-issuing banks inhibited its ability to compete with
VISA. The plaintiff argued that the relevant market included only
credit card services. The court, however, agreed with VISA's position
that the market encompassed other methods of payment besides
credit cards, such as cash and checks. The court ultimately concluded
that VISA did not possess market power in that market.90 On appeal,
(1989) (stating that "[c]urrent U.S. antitrust law needlessly inhibits strategic alliances
designed to develop and commercialize new technology").
83. Baker, supra note 4, at 1051.
84. 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980).
85. Id. at 1377-85.
86. Denial of Access to Realtor® MLS Isn't Unreasonable Restraint of Trade, 68 Anti-
trust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1703, at 322 (Feb. 10, 1995).
87. Id. at 955.
88. Id. at 962-63.
89. 596 F. Supp. 1231 (S.D. Fla. 1984), aff'd, 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986).
90. Id. at 1265.
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the Eleventh Circuit refused to reevaluate the district court's determi-
nation of the relevant market.91
A subsequent case, SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc.92
("VISA P'), came to the opposite conclusion concerning the relevant
market in which to analyze credit card networks. In VISA I, Sears
sued the VISA credit card system for denying it entry to the net-
work.93 Sears marketed its own proprietary credit card, called the
"Discover Card," and applied for the right to issue a VISA card as
well.94 VISA rejected Sears' original application after adopting a rule
that denied membership to any firm that marketed Discover Cards,
American Express Cards, or any other card "deemed competitive" by
VISA's Board of Directors.95 Sears then tried to enter VISA by
purchasing MountainWest Financial, a bank that was already a VISA
issuer.96 Sears planned to launch an aggressively priced new VISA
card program, to be called "Prime Option," which would carry no an-
nual fee and would offer discounted finance charges. After VISA re-
fused to allow MountainWest to issue additional VISA cards, Sears
sued VISA under section 1.97
In the case, VISA abandoned its position taken in NaBanco I that
the relevant market included credit cards as well as other forms of
payment. VISA agreed to stipulate that credit cards constituted a sep-
arate market.98 In 1992, a jury in the district court reached a rule of
reason verdict in favor of Sears, focusing on the issuance of credit
cards as a relevant market.99
In addition to confusing the relevant market standard, the VISA
II case sent mixed signals with regard to the manner for determining
the market power of network joint ventures. VISA argued that it did
not possess market power in the credit card market because finance
charges and other fees were set independently by the six thousand
member banks that'issued VISA cards. The district court in VISA I
disagreed with this argument and found that the members of the
91. National Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592, 603-04 (11th Cir.
1986) ("NaBanco IP).
92. 819 F. Supp. 956 (D. Utah 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir.
1994).
93. ld. at 964.
94. Id. at 963-64.
95. SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 961 (10th Cir. 1994) ("VISA
I/").
96. Id.
97. 1d.
98. Id. at 966.
99. 819 F. Supp. at 967.
November 1995]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
VISA network used their market power collectively to exclude Sears
from the VISA market.100 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in
VISA II reversed.' 0' In its decision, the court of appeals relied on the
fact that the "intrasystem market" (i.e., the market among the six
thousand VISA credit card issuers) was "remarkably unconcen-
trated."'10 2 Given this lack of concentration, the court believed that
VISA could not have exercised market power in a manner that could
harm consumers. 103
These recent cases provide little guidance to business executives
attempting to design reasonable membership rules for modem net-
works. Based on the NaBanco II and VISA II cases, it will be difficult
for antitrust practitioners to determine the relevant market in which
to analyze network access restrictions. Is the relevant market only the
market for the specific products covered by a network (e.g., credit
cards)? Or does the market encompass all other networks marketing
similar products (e.g., credit cards, check-cashing services and elec-
tronic funds transfers)? These cases also fail to answer how the market
power of the parties should be assessed once the relevant market is
determined. When the members of a joint venture act to exclude third
parties, should their market power be analyzed on a collective or indi-
vidual basis? The district court in VISA I determined that the collec-
tive market power of the joint venture members was relevant,10 4 while
the Tenth Circuit, despite the collective action within the joint ven-
ture, analyzed the members' market power on an individual basis in
VISA 11. 105
It is time for the courts to adopt a new approach that clarifies
these and other relevant standards for analyzing network access re-
strictions. Any such approach must begin with an understanding of the
economic effects of network joint ventures in the American economy
today.
IM. The Economic Effects of Network Access Restrictions
A. The Efficiencies of Network Joint Ventures
Network joint ventures generate significant economic efficiencies.
Indeed, in many cases, such networks create the conditions that make
100. Id. at 963-64.
101. 36 F.3d at 969.
102. Id. at 968.
103. Id. at 968-69.
104. 819 F. Supp. at 963-64.
105. 36 F.3d at 968-69.
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certain markets possible. Credit card and ATM networks, electronic
funds transfers, professional sports leagues, real estate multiple listing
services and stock and commodities exchanges are all examples of
products and services that could not exist without networks.
Pure interchange is one of the most important efficiencies of a
network joint venture. Networks provide the rules and facilities that
allow members to effectively interchange traffic or transactions with
each other. The interchange provided through a network can make
markets more efficient. A stock exchange or real estate multiple list-
ing service, for example, matches the maximum number of "buy" and
"sell" orders. By concentrating transactions in one place, the network
ensures the narrowest spread between bids and offers. 10 6 Network
joint ventures are also effective at setting and enforcing standards for
certain markets. Such standards-setting is particularly important for
high-tech industries. Computer networks require a high degree of co-
ordination in order to operate effectively. A networkjoint venture can
establish common standards for communication among the different
terminals of its members as well as common measures for security and
protection against errors and fraud.10 7 Standards-setting may also be
critical to the operation of other types of markets. A sports league, for
example, is a type of network joint venture that, by setting the rules of
play (such as team schedules, player eligibility rules, team salary caps,
and rules for free agency), provides a foundation for the operation of
amateur and professional sports.108
Network joint ventures may generate substantial economies of
scale. By combining all of the transactions in a particular market, net-
works can decrease per unit costs for their members. Membership in a
network often allows smaller competitors to receive products or serv-
ices that they could not afford on their own. The Associated Press, for
example, permits small-town newspapers to receive the same interna-
tional wire stories as the New York Times and Washington Post. The
VISA and Mastercard networks allow small banks to issue credit
cards that can be used by their customers on an international basis.
Due to these substantial efficiencies, the legality of network joint
ventures themselves usually should not be an issue in antitrust cases.
106. Baker, supra note 4, at 1011-12.
107. See Dennis W. Carlton & J. Mark Klamer, The Need for Coordination Among
Firms, With Special Reference to Network Industries, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 446, 463 (1983).
108. See NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85,101-02 (1984) (declining to apply the
per se rule to certain rules adopted by NCAA on grounds that the organization established
certain competitive restrictions which were necessary in order for the relevant product,
amateur collegiate athletics, to be available at all).
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Unlike certain merger cases, courts and regulatory agencies should
not be attempting to break up network joint ventures. Courts should
regulate the conduct rather than the structure of such organizations.
In particular, courts should carefully review the membership restric-
tions imposed by network joint ventures to ensure that they do not
unduly limit competition in the markets affected by the network.
B. Effects in Primary and Secondary Markets
Antitrust analysis of restrictions on access to network joint ven-
tures would be greatly clarified if the courts recognized that such re-
strictions affect competition in two distinct markets. The "primary"
market is the market served, and in many cases made possible by, a
network joint venture. In the primary market, firms that are members
of a network joint venture compete among themselves to provide
products and services to the ultimate users. Banks offer credit cards
and ATM services to consumers, brokers sell securities or real estate
to clients, and professional sports teams market their tickets to sports
fans.109 The "secondary" market, at a level once removed from the
ultimate consumer, is the market in which network joint ventures
compete among themselves to provide network services. In the secon-
dary credit card market, for example, VISA, MasterCard, Discover
Card and other proprietary credit card systems compete to provide
credit card services to the banks that issue the cards and the
merchants who honor the cards. However, in many secondary mar-
kets, there is no actual competition because a single network joint
venture holds monopoly power. For example, within their markets,
there are no rivals for the major professional sports leagues or for
most telephone, utility, and cable television networks.
Many of these monopoly networks have arisen because they are
the most efficient means of serving the relevant market. Indeed, many
secondary markets constitute "natural monopolies" in which it is not
feasible for more than one network to operate effectively. 110 The
economies of scale involved in telephone, utility, or cable networks,
for example, usually make it impractical for a rival exchange to dupli-
cate the necessary network infrastructure. The per user costs of such
109. See Baker, supra note 4, at 1007.
110. "Natural monopoly refers to a situation where a single firm can supply all of the
market demand for a product at [a] lower cost than could two or more firms." Margaret E.
Guerin-Calvert, Network Merger Analysis, Paper Presented to the 43d Annual Spring
Meeting of the American Bar Association Antitrust Law Section (Apr. 6, 1995) (on file
with author).
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networks usually decline as they increase in size and add new custom-
ers."' Monopoly networks also result naturally from the requirements
of certain high-tech markets. Such markets often cannot function
without a single industry-wide standard, such as a computer operating
system or particular hardware specification. A single network can de-
velop and enforce such a standard more effectively than can multiple
networks." 2
Because of these natural monopoly characteristics, denial of ac-
cess to a network joint venture is likely to substantially lessen compe-
tition in the primary market. A network can be visualized as a
gateway through which a firm must pass in order to enter the primary
market. Often the only means of entry to the primary market is
through the network gateway. A firm will therefore not be able to
participate in the primary market if it is denied access to such a net-
work. A firm, for example, cannot field a sports team or sell stock,
bonds, or real estate without participating in the network that serves
such markets. When a firm is excluded from an essential network,
consumers in the primary market are deprived of the benefits that
may result from the addition of new entrants, such as increased out-
put, lower prices, and technological innovations. By requiring open
access to an essential network, courts can avoid such adverse competi-
tive effects.
Although open access protects competition in the primary mar-
ket, it may limit competition in the secondary market. Indeed, in the
absence of an open access decree, exclusionary membership rules can
111. An antitrust commentator has pointed out that "[t]he critical characteristic of a
natural monopoly is that it is only as more output is concentrated in a single supplier that
unit cost will decline. For example, one company can supply electricity to an entire city at
less cost than two companies providing the service. Once the first firm sets up its plant and
wires the city, it is much cheaper for it to add additional homes to its network than for a
second firm to set up a completely separate plant and network." Stephen F. Ross, Monop-
oly Sports Leagues, 73 Mm'r. L. REv. 643,716 (1989) (citing A. KAHN, Trm EcoN oMIcs oF
REGULAT oN: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 119 (1971)). But see Wired?, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 16, 1995, at A14 (arguing that local telephone service is not a natural monopoly and
that "[mionopolies like ... the Baby Bells ... cah only exist if the coercive power of
government keeps out competitors").
112. Companies can gain a monopoly rather quickly if they are able to develop a new
standard for a high-technology industry. For example, Microsoft has been able to dictate
the operating system standards for the personal computer industry, and Intel has estab-
lished the standard for the microchips used in the processing "brain" of a personal com-
puter. See Steve Lohr, Ground Rules for the Great Global Connection, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
1995, at El, E16. As Charles F. Rule, a partner at the law firm of Covington & Burling and
former chief of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, has stated, "[i]n high-
tech markets where standards are important, the big get bigger .... That's how these
markets work, and there's nothing necessarily wrong with it." Id. at E16.
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enhance secondary market competition. Firms that are excluded from
an existing network will be forced to form their own networks or to
compete individually in the secondary market. Furthermore, exclu-
sionary rules tend to promote innovation in the secondary market.
Firms will have a greater incentive to assume the risks of forming a
new network joint venture if they believe that they can exclude poten-
tial future entrants and thereby retain the fruits of the venture's suc-
cess for themselves. Thus, some commentators have argued that,
because of the incentives to innovation promoted by network access
restrictions, the courts should only compel access to a network under
unusual circumstances. 113
Compulsory access can therefore have opposite effects in the pri-
mary and secondary markets. In the primary market, open access en-
hances competition and benefits consumers by allowing new firms to
enter the market. In the secondary market, compulsory access may
limit competition by discouraging the formation of new networks.11 4
(1) Beneficial Effects of Open Access in Primary Markets
When access to a network joint venture is open, consumers bene-
fit from enhanced competition in the primary market. New entrants to
a market controlled by a network joint venture may have a lower cost
structure than the incumbents and may develop more efficient means
of delivering products or services to consumers. If such firms are per-
mitted to enter the primary market, they may increase output and
lower prices;115 if they are excluded, consumers lose the benefits of
their presence. As the Fifth Circuit stated in Realty Multi-List, "[by
virtue of access restrictions,] the public is denied the incentive to com-
petition that new entry may bring .... A new entrant into the market
might, for example, be more aggressive and willing to accept a lower
113. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 4, at 1080-83.
114. Thus, in VISA I, both Sears and VISA could argue that competition would be
enhanced if they prevailed. Sears pointed out that its admission to the VISA system would
enhance competition in the primary market, and VISA argued that such admission would
reduce competition in the secondary market. SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 819 F.
Supp. 956, 966 (D. Utah 1993), rev'd, 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2600 (1995) ("VISA r').
115. See DENNIS W. CARLTON & STEVEN C. SALOP, You KEEP ON KNOCKING BUT
YOU CAN'T COME IN: EVALUATING RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO INPUT JOINT VENTURES
28 (University of Chicago Center for the Study of the Economy and the State Working
Paper No. 111, 1995) ("[S]uppose the joint venture had admitted the new, low cost mem-
bers and those new members caused market output to expand. If these new members in-
crease total output in the market, that increase in output would lower output prices and
benefit consumers. Even though the collective market share of the joint venture would
rise, it would be erroneous to condemn this procompetitive admission of new members.").
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commission rate. Exclusion of such a [new entrant] would tend to re-
duce the amount of price competition in the market."11 6
The competitive harm of access restrictions often comes not from
increases in prices (as might occur if current members of a network
joint venture were expelled) but from exclusionary conduct that pre-
vents prices in the primary market from falling.1' 7 In the VISA I case,
for example, there was evidence that Sears' entry into the VISA net-
work would have caused credit card prices to fall." 8 Sears intended to
charge no annual fee for its Prime Option VISA card, as opposed to
the $15 to $20 fee being charged by other issuers.'1 9 Sears also
planned to charge interest under an "innovative schedule" that would
have substantially lowered interest rates.'20 Sears also had the "mar-
keting muscle" to make its new card successful.12' Indeed, there was
evidence that the VISA members' opposition to Sears' entry was
based, at least in part, on their own expectations that such entry would
lead to lower prices.' 22 As a result of the VISA members' exclusion-
ary action, a "large, innovative, low-cost price-cutting producer" was
excluded from the relevant market. 23 Had Sears been allowed to in-
troduce its Prime Option card within the VISA market, prices paid by
consumers for credit card financing might well have been substantially
lower. 24
Despite evidence of the potential consumer welfare advantages
resulting from admitting Sears to the VISA system, the Tenth Circuit
in VISA II reversed the jury's verdict for Sears. 25 The court's decision
116. United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1371 (5th Cir. 1980).
117. Carlton & Salop, supra note 115, at 27.
118. See Dennis W. Carlton & Alan S. Frankel, The Antitrust Economics of Credit
Card Networks, 63 ANrrrRusT L.J. 643, 662 (1995).
119. Id.
120. See Carlton & Frankel, supra note 118, at 666.
121. SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 956, 986-87 (D. Utah 1993),
rev'd, 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 2600 (1995) ("VISA P).
122. See Carlton & Frankel, supra note 118, at 663.
123. Id. at 654.
124. See Carlton & Frankel, supra note 118, at 667 ("[Sears'] large-scale, heavily pro-
moted introduction of the Prime Option VISA card would have allowed it to provide mil-
lions of credit card members with relatively low cost credit cards."). Sears was prepared to
offer a VISA card with an initial interest rate of only 12.9% (compared to the annual rate
of 19.8% charged by VISA's ten largest bank card issuers). See Lee Richardson, Let A
Thousand Credit Cards Bloom, WALL ST. J., May 23, 1995, at A22. The entry of such a low-
price card may have caused a general decline in prices in the credit card market, where
profits have been inexplicably high. See Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition
in the Credit Card Market, 81 AM. ECON. REv. 50, 53-56 (1991).
125. SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 972 (10th Cir. 1994) ("VISA
I/").
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was based on its conclusion that VISA was unable to exercise market
power because the credit card market was so unconcentrated (i.e.,
there were over six thousand credit card issuers in the VISA sys-
tem). 126 This reasoning overlooks the fact that the VISA members had
effectively used their collective market power to exclude Sears from
the VISA system. Because the members acted collectively through the
VISA network joint venture, their market power should have been
analyzed on an aggregate basis.
The Tenth Circuit in VISA II failed to appreciate the importance
of maintaining competition within the primary market served by a
network joint venture. The members of such ventures remain in-
dependent competitors despite their affiliation with the venture. In-
deed, the existence of competition among joint venture members is
what distinguishes a network joint venture monopoly from a single
firm monopolist. The members of a network joint venture are not sim-
ply stockholders or partners in the venture; they are competitors
whose continued rivalry benefits consumers. As such, they should not
be allowed to conspire among themselves to prevent potential com-
petitors from entering the primary market. In establishing and enforc-
ing membership rules such as those at issue in VISA II, the members
of a joint venture are acting in a collective manner. The district court
correctly recognized that a jury could have legitimately concluded that
this collective exercise of market power unduly harmed consumers
and that an open access order was appropriate to redress that harm. 127
(2) Adverse Effects of Open Access in Secondary Markets
Competition in the secondary market, as in the primary market,
can generate many economic benefits. Networks are more likely to
lower their prices and implement improvements when they have to
compete with other networks for potential members.128 The VISA
and MasterCard credit card networks, for example, must compete
with each other and with the "proprietary" credit cards (e.g., Dis-
cover, American Express, and Diners Club) for the business of
merchants and card-issuing banks, and ATM systems must work to
make themselves attractive to the issuers of ATM cards. When a net-
work has monopoly power, the absence of competition in the secon-
dary market has "the same detriments associated with monopolies
generally: poor service, discrimination, lack of innovation, and high
126. Id. at 968.
127. 819 F. Supp. at 984-88.
128. See Baker, supra note 4, at 1010.
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prices."'1 29 Network monopolies, such as cable television and sports
leagues, would likely be forced to provide their services more effi-
ciently and at a lower price if they faced competition at the network
level.130
A court runs the risk of preserving a network monopoly when it
requires open access to an existing network joint venture. Once it has
gained entry to a successful network joint venture, a firm may have no
need to participate in a rival venture because it will already have ac-
cess to the primary market. Furthermore, members of joint ventures
may not be interested in competing with their own venture because
such competition reduces their profits as members of the venture. 131
Thus, commentators have pointed out that "joint ventures sometimes
can reduce competition by becoming overly inclusive."'132
A compulsory access rule encourages conservatism rather than
innovation. Firms have less incentive to invest in open access start-up
ventures under compulsory access rules. The original investors in a
new network joint venture face substantial risks and uncertainties.
The up-front investment required to develop a new network is signifi-
cant, and firms may not be willing to risk such an investment if they
perceive that a court will dilute their gains by ordering open access to
the venture. Firms may also be more likely to hold back at the outset
and refrain from a risky investment in a new network if they believe
129. Id. at 1015.
130. Many local cable networks have a "reputation for poor customer service." Mark
Landler, The Dishes Are Coming: Satellites Go Suburban, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1995, at 37,
40. Direct-broadcast satellite television, or DBS, allows televisions to receive multi-channel
broadcasts directly from satellites and thus bypass cable systems. DBS became nationally
available in the fall of 1994 and has more than one million subscribers. With such a viable
competitor in the secondary market, the cable networks may be forced to improve their
customer service. Id. Professor Stephen Ross argues that the government should break up
Major League Baseball and the NFL; he states that the resulting competitive market will
"correct the harms that the monopoly sports leagues inflict on taxpayers and fans." Ross,
supra note 111, at 646. Professor Ross believes that, if there were competing leagues in
these professional sports, the leagues would be more eager to add expansion teams and
"would vie against each other for the right to play in public stadiums, driving rents up and
tax subsidies down." Id.
131. The Supreme Court has recognized the tendency of joint venture partners not to
compete with their own affiliates, pointing out that "[r]ealistically the parents would not
compete with their progeny." United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 168
(1964).
132. Carlton & Salop, supra note 115, at 34; see also David S. Evans & Richard
Schmalensee, Economic Aspects of Payment Card Systems and Antitrust Policy Toward
Joint Ventures, 63 ANrrrusT LJ. 861, 876 (1995).
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that, after the venture becomes successful, they can obtain access to it
in any event.133
The Associated Press litigation reveals the extent to which open
access can reduce competition in the secondary market. In Associated
Press, the Supreme Court required AP to abandon a bylaw provision
through which local member newspapers could veto the admission of
their competitors. 34 In his dissent, Justice Roberts pointed out that
the Court's decree might lead to a monopoly, 135 and that is exactly
what happened. AP became an open-entry network after the decree
and, preferring the services of AP, newspapers began to abandon
other wire service networks. AP's rival networks, United Press
("UP") and International News Service ("INS"), became less viable
competitors as they lost members to AP. UP and INS merged in 1958
to form United Press International ("UPI"). UPI's client base contin-
ued to move to AP, and UPI ultimately filed for bankruptcy, leaving
AP as the dominant news-gathering network.136
C. Balancing the Effects of Access Restrictions in Primary and Secondary
Markets
Compelled access, then, often has opposite effects in the primary
and secondary markets affected by a network joint venture. Competi-
tion in the primary market is enhanced when networks are required to
admit all qualified firms. In such a case, aggressive firms with innova-
tive ideas for delivering products and services to consumers will be
able to enter the primary market. Compelling such access, however, is
also likely to reduce competition in the secondary market. When open
access is compelled, new entrants will be more likely to concentrate
their energies on the primary market rather than on forming a new
network joint venture to compete in the secondary market. Incentives
for investing in new networks in the secondary market will be reduced
as market participants become aware that early investors will not have
a significant advantage over late-comers.
133. As Donald Baker points out:
[a]re we sure that successful network founders would do it again-or so. aggres-
sively-if they knew that their 'differentiated' product would end up being "uni-
versal"?... Is differentiation not the type of incentive ... which is likely to be
blunted if the would-be innovators believe that, upon the success of the venture,
the advantage can be usurped by late-comers?
Baker, supra note 4, at 1073.
134. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1945).
135. Id. at 48 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
136. Baker, supra note 4, at 1035.
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It is possible for the courts and regulatory agencies to balance
effectively the trade-off between these beneficial and adverse effects
in the primary and secondary markets. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
required the federal courts to use a similar balancing approach in ana-
lyzing the legality of vertical restrictions imposed by a manufacturer
on its distributors. In Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., the
Court adopted a rule of reason standard that balances the adverse
effects of such restrictions on intrabrand competition (i.e., competi-
tion among the distributors who resell the manufacturer's products)
against the beneficial effects on interbrand competition (i.e., competi-
tion among manufacturers of different brands).137 If the courts can
balance the intrabrand and interbrand effects of vertical restraints,
they should also be able to balance the beneficial and adverse effects
of open network access in primary and secondary markets.
Indeed, in most cases, it should be obvious whether the balance
falls in favor of compelled access to a network joint venture. Courts
should recognize that competition in the primary market is more im-
portant than competition in the secondary market because primary
market competition directly benefits consumers. 138 Firms in the pri-
mary market deal at first hand with consumers, and innovations in
that market are more likely to lead to lower prices. 139 Thus, whenever
137. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977).
138. Unfortunately, the federal courts have failed to recognize this fact. The Supreme
Court in GTE Sylvania found that, because it involves different manufacturers, interbrand
competition is more likely than intrabrand competition to lead to innovations and efficien-
cies in quality and pricing. 433 U.S. at 52 n.19. In network cases, the courts have equated
secondary market competition with interbrand competition and primary market competi-
tion with intrabrand competition. Confused perhaps by GTE Sylvania's praise of inter-
brand competition, both the district court and the Tenth Circuit in VISA I and VISA II,
erroneously concluded that competition in the secondary market should be accorded a
higher status than competition in the primary market. SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA U.S.A.,
Inc., 819 F. Supp. 956, 983-84 (D. Utah 1993), rev'd, 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 2600 (1995) ("VISA 1"). ("[Sears' admission to the VISA system] may
provide short-term intrasystem competitive benefits within the VISA system, but in the
long run, in the court's judgment, the damages from such inclusion will outstrip the bene-
fits."); see also SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 966 (10th Cir. 1994)
("VISA IP) ("Interbrand competition ... is the primary concern of antitrust law." (citing
433 U.S. at 52 n.19)).
139. Competition in the primary market affected by a network is more similar in effect
to interbrand than to intrabrand competition. The members of networks are usually in-
dependent firms that compete in a manner similar to that of the manufacturers of indus-
trial products referred to by the Court in GTE Sylvania. This analogy holds even when
members of a network sell their products under a common trademark. The card-issuing
banks in the VISA and MasterCard networks, for example, compete with each other on
annual fees, finance charges, and credit limits despite the fact that they market their cards
under a common name. Indeed, the domestic credit card industry is "increasingly competi-
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a network controls a resource necessary for effective competition in
the primary market, the balance should be struck in favor of open
entry to the network. In such a case, the beneficial effect of open ac-
cess to the primary market should outweigh any adverse effect in the
secondary market.
Denial of access to an essential network joint venture completely
eliminates a firm from the primary market. By requiring open access,
a court can ensure that consumers are not deprived of the advantages
of enhanced competition, including lower prices and higher quality
products and services. On the other side of the ledger, compulsory
access to an essential joint venture should not have significant adverse
effects in the secondary market. While open access to an essential net-
work enhances actual competition in the primary market, it merely
reduces potential competition in the secondary market. When a net-
work is essential for entry to the primary market, there will, by defini-
tion, be no alternative means of competing effectively with the
network.140 A potential entrant can only compete with an existing net-
work if a comparable network is formed in the future. Certainly, a
firm that gains access to an essential network joint venture will have
less incentive to join a future network. In exchange for a reduction of
potential future competition, however, actual competition in the pri-
mary market will be immediately enhanced by the entry of the new
firm.
Because the benefits of open access in the primary market are so
much greater than the adverse effects in the secondary market, the
courts should be willing to regulate the membership restrictions of all
essential networks. Once access to a network has been found to be
essential to effective competition in the primary market, the courts
should review the network's membership rules to determine whether
they are unduly exclusionary.
Open access, however, should not be compelled to non-essential
networks. When access to a network is not required to enter the pri-
mary market, the balance shifts in favor of protecting competition in
the secondary market. In such a case, primary market competition will
tive." G. Bruce Knecht, MasterCard and VISA Post Big Gains in Revenue as Well as Cards
Outstanding, WALL ST. J., May 31, 1995, at A2. Many issuers within each of the credit card
networks are using lower interest rates and other benefits to entice cardholders to transfer
their charge card balances from one issuer to another. Id.
140. See Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 132, at 885 ("By definition, access to an
essential facility is necessary to compete effectively in the market, so that letting an addi-
tional firm use an essential facility can only involve bringing new competition to the mar-
ket; it cannot involve creating linkages between existing competitors.").
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not be significantly reduced by exclusionary membership rules. If a
firm is denied access to a non-essential network, it can still enter the
primary market on its own or through an alternative network.
Furthermore, in requiring open access to a non-essential network,
a court may significantly harm competition in the secondary market.
Under such circumstances, a compulsory access decree will reduce ac-
tual, rather than merely potential, competition in the secondary mar-
ket. A firm may elect to access a predominant network simply because
it has the most members or the lowest fees. In doing so, the firm
would forego other alternatives, such as entry de novo or through a
smaller rival network, which would have enhanced actual competition
in the secondary market. Therefore, when access to a particular net-
work in the secondary market is not necessary for entry to the primary
market, the courts should not interfere with the membership rules
adopted by the network. In such cases, consumer welfare is better
served by allowing the networks to compete for members in the best
manner they see fit, free of judicial regulation.
IV. A Proposed Approach to Network Access Restrictions
A. An "Ancillary Restraints" Approach
Courts and regulatory agencies need to adopt a new form of anal-
ysis that will allow them to balance the beneficial and adverse effects
of restrictions on access to network joint ventures. None of the ap-
proaches developed by the courts to date have been effective. A per
se approach is too harsh-it fails to consider the potential adverse
effects of compelled access on competition in the secondary market. A
rule of reason approach is too vague-it provides little guidance to
courts or to business executives on the types of access restrictions that
should be permitted or prohibited.141
Traditionally, courts and antitrust commentators have assumed
that they must choose between two divergent methods of analyzing
conduct under section 1 of the Sherman Act.142 At one extreme, the
per se rule summarily condemns certain practices on their face with-
out any consideration of their competitive effects or possible justifica-
tions. At the other extreme, the rule of reason requires an exhaustive
141. For a discussion of the per se and rule of reason approaches, see supra notes 46-
60, 61-105 and accompanying text.
142. See Edward Brunet, Streamlining Antitrust Litigation by "Facial Examination" of
Restraints: The Burger Court and the Per Se-Rule of Reason Distinction, 60 WASH. L. Rnv.
1, 22 (1984) (referring to the "all-too-popular misunderstanding that the rule of reason and
per se approaches are polar opposites").
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inquiry into every conceivable circumstance bearing on the competi-
tive implications of a particular restraint. There are, however, meth-
ods of analyzing section 1 restraints between the extremes of the per
se and rule of reason approaches. Indeed, section 1 conduct is best
evaluated under a continuum. In all cases, the courts should be at-
tempting to determine the likely competitive effects of the restraint at
issue. In certain cases, such effects will be obvious on the face of the
conduct at issue, and the legality of the conduct can be determined
after a minimal factual inquiry similar to a traditional per se approach.
Other cases, lying between the per se and rule of reason extremes,
require courts to inquire into certain market conditions but do not
necessitate full-blown investigation under the rule of reason. Finally,
in a few instances, the competitive impact of the conduct at issue will
be so ambiguous that the entire investigation required by the rule of
reason will be necessary. 143
The best approach for analyzing network joint venture access re-
strictions lies within the section 1 continuum between the per se and
rule of reason extremes. Courts should use an "ancillary restraints"
approach to consider the legality of a network joint venture's mem-
bership rules. An ancillary restraints approach equates the legality of
a restraint with its relationship to the needs of a separate efficiency-
enhancing arrangement, such as a joint venture. If a restriction on
competition is no broader than required to promote the efficiency of a
joint venture, it is upheld as an ancillary restraint. However, if the
restraint is broader than necessary to meet those objectives, it is
deemed a "naked," and thus illegal, restraint of trade. Such an ap-
proach permits a court to enjoin particular aspects of joint ventures
that are harmful to competition without precluding the entire joint
venture. There is considerable precedent supporting an ancillary re-
straints approach to network access restrictions. In several network
joint venture cases, the federal courts have concentrated on the legal-
ity of certain ancillary restraints implemented by the venture rather
than on the legality of the venture itself.144
143. For a discussion of how section 1 conduct can be arranged along a continuum
rather than divided arbitrarily into the per se and rule of reason extremes, see Thomas A.
Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New Standard for Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1753 (1994); see also Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling
the Per Se and Rule of Reason Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 685
(1991).
144. In Terminal Railroad Ass'n, the Supreme Court emphasized the efficiencies of the
terminal system. Rather than requiring its dissolution, the Court's decree simply mandated
that the terminal provide equal access to all qualified parties. United States v. Terminal
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Unlike a per se approach, an ancillary restraints analysis does not
summarily condemn network joint ventures that have restrictive mem-
bership rules. Such ventures generate too many efficiencies to be pre-
cluded on their face.145 Yet many network joint ventures have too
much market power to escape antitrust scrutiny altogether. It is there-
fore appropriate for the courts to regulate the conduct of network
joint ventures to ensure that they do not abuse that market power. An
ancillary restraints approach, unlike the traditional rule of reason,
provides a means of regulating such conduct without an exhaustive
inquiry into all the circumstances surrounding the defendants' con-
duct. Under such an approach, courts can avoid a complicated analysis
of the parties' market power and can focus on the extent to which
particular membership rules are necessary to preserve a network's
efficiency.
B. Proving the Legality of Access Restrictions
Courts can allocate the burden of proving the legality of access
restrictions in a manner that will simplify their analysis. A potential
entrant should have the initial burden of proving that access to a net-
work joint venture is essential to effective competition in the primary
market. If the plaintiff fails to meet that initial burden, the member-
ship rules adopted by a network joint venture would not come into
Railroad Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 411-12 (1912). In NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85,
117 (1984), the Court pointed out that the NCAA should be allowed to establish certain
limited restrictions on competition, such as requirements for the number of players on each
team, in order to maintain the efficiency of amateur collegiate athletics. In Worthen Bank
& Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F.2d 119, 127 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974), the Eighth Circuit assumed the legality of the VISA credit card
system and focused on the issue of whether an exclusivity provision was necessary to en-
sure the system's effectiveness. In NaBanco 1, the court upheld the interchange fee estab-
lished by the VISA system, characterizing it as an ancillary restraint that contributed to the
effectiveness of the system. National Bancard Corp. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 779 F.2d 592,
601, 604 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986) ("NaBanco P'). The Tenth
Circuit in the VISA H case expressly adopted an ancillary restraints approach to VISA's
membership restrictions, stating that the relevant issue was whether "the alleged restraint
is reasonably related to VISA U.S.A.'s operation and no broader than necessary to effectu-
ate the association's business." SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 36 F.3d 958,970 (10th
Cir. 1994) ("VISA IP) (citing NaBanco 11, 779 F.2d at 601). In Realty Multi-List, the Fifth
Circuit found that a real estate multiple listing service's membership rules must "have le-
gitimate justifications in the competitive needs of the association itself [and] must be rea-.
sonably necessary to the accomplishment of the legitimate goals [of the association] and
narrowly tailored to that end." United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1375
(5th Cir. 1980).
145. For a discussion of such efficiencies, see supra notes 106-08 and accompanying
text.
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issue. Thus, a court would only have to determine the reasonableness
of a joint venture's membership rules if the plaintiff proved that the
venture constituted an essential facility. Once the plaintiff made such
proof, however, the issue of the membership rules would be in play.
The network joint venture would then be required to introduce its
own proof that the membership rules were ancillary to the venture's
efficiency objectives. The venture may, for example, argue that the
rules were necessary to prevent the venture from exceeding its capac-
ity, to ensure the technical qualification of network participants, or to
protect against free-riding on the original partners' investments or
know-how. A court could then decide whether the venture's member-
ship rules should be retained, voided, or modified in some way.
Such an approach to network access restrictions can be under-
taken without the usual deficiencies associated with the rule of reason
because it provides triers of fact with appropriate guidelines and ob-
jective benchmarks to follow. The traditional rule of reason has not
failed because of the courts' inability to balance the positive and nega-
tive aspects of defendants' conduct. In nearly every area of the law,
courts must balance the relative equities of conduct before rendering
a final judgement. The rule of reason is deficient as a tool of antitrust
analysis simply because it gives so little guidance on the standards for
balancing the competitive trade-offs of section 1 restraints. Few deci-
sions have identified the types of presumptions, burdens of proof, and
other evidentiary tools that could help the courts to achieve a worka-
ble and consistent method of evaluating section 1 conduct under the
rule of reason.146
The use of presumptions would provide an effective framework
for the courts' analysis of network access restrictions. Through pre-
sumptions, courts can focus their attention on critical issues that deter-
mine the ultimate outcome of their analysis. Presumptions force the
parties with greatest access to the relevant evidence to come forward
with their proof. Accordingly, there should be an initial presumption
against open access to a network. In order to rebut this presumption,
the party seeking access should be required to prove that the network
controls a resource without which it could not compete effectively in
the primary market. Specifically, the plaintiff must prove that, "but
for" access to the network, it would not be able to compete on an
equal basis in that market. If the plaintiff is able to meet this "but for"
test, the presumption against open access would be rebutted and the
146. See supra notes 61-105 and accompanying text.
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burden would shift to the network joint venture to prove that the
membership restrictions at issue were reasonable. In order to meet its
burden, the joint venture would have to show that it excluded the
plaintiff under membership rules that were necessary to ensure the
efficiency of the network. The network might, for example, have al-
ready reached its maximum potential capacity, or the plaintiff might
lack the necessary qualifications to participate in the network.
Some commentators believe that judicially imposed open access
rules can significantly harm network markets.14 7 The federal judiciary
must be particularly careful not to harm high-technology markets by
undue intervention because such industries are currently one of the
greatest sources of well-paying domestic jobs. Under the proposed ap-
proach, the initial presumption against open access would protect net-
work joint ventures against over-regulation. The membership
restrictions of many, if not most, network joint ventures will not be at
issue under such an approach. The initial "but for" test is a substantial
hurdle for potential plaintiffs to meet. Unless the plaintiff can show
that it must participate in a network joint venture in order to compete
effectively in the primary market, the plaintiff's case would be dis-
missed on summary judgment. In the absence of such proof, the net-
work would not have to prove the reasonableness of its membership
restrictions and would be free to adopt any access rules it wished.
The presumption against open access ensures that access to a net-
work joint venture will only be granted when it is necessary to pro-
mote competition. Courts and commentators have pointed out that
the antitrust laws are designed to protect competition, not individual
competitors, and that open access should not be compelled simply be-
cause a particular plaintiff is disadvantaged by its inability to use a
network. 148 Once a plaintiff meets the "but for" test, a court may be
confident that the plaintiff's admission to the network will enhance
competition in general and not just the plaintiff's individual business
147. See Lohr, supra note 112, at El; see also Baker, supra note 4, at 1076 ("Compul-
sory access is highly regulatory: the antitrust court is required to act as if it were a public
utility commission setting the precise terms for membership or particular access charges.
Yet the court lacks any special expertise or staff to do this kind of job.").
148. See Carlton & Salop, supra note 115, at 32 ("General allegations of boycott and
exclusion often confuse injury to a competitor with injury to competition."). In denying
Sears' admission to the VISA credit card system, the Tenth Circuit pointed out that the
basic objective of the Sherman Act is to bring "to consumers the benefits of lower prices,
better products, and more efficient production methods." 36 F.3d at 963. The court con-
cluded that "a practice ultimately judged anticompetitive is one which harms competition,
not a particular competitor," and held that Sears' exclusion from the VISA system was not
actionable because Sears could not demonstrate such an adverse competitive effect. Id.
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interests. Under these circumstances, consumer welfare is enhanced
by an open access requirement. Indeed, the plaintiff in such cases will
be acting, in effect, as the representative of all firms who may want to
access the network in the future. The plaintiff's individual interests,
then, coincide with the general interests of consumers. Once the plain-
tiff wins an open access decree, consumers will benefit from the ability
of future entrants to provide better prices and higher quality products
in the primary market.
When the "but for" test is met, the beneficial effect of compelled
access in the primary market outweighs any adverse effects in the sec-
ondary market. Under such circumstances, a firm would only be able
to participate in the primary market as a member of the relevant net-
work. Thus, an open access decree ensures an immediate enhance-
ment of primary market competition. At the same time, such a decree
will not have a significant adverse effect in the secondary market.
Once a plaintiff has prevailed under the "but for" test, it will be clear
that there are no comparable alternative gateways in the secondary
market. Because the plaintiff could not have entered the primary mar-
ket on its own or through another network, its admission to the net-
work at issue will not eliminate any immediate secondary market
competition that would otherwise have existed.
This new approach to network access restrictions conserves judi-
cial resources and provides better guidance to practitioners and busi-
ness executives on how they can design networks to comply with the
antitrust laws. The issues of market power and market definition,
which have complicated so many rule of reason cases, will no longer
be a source of confusion.149 The relevant market will become obvious
as courts begin to view the primary and secondary markets separately.
Courts will recognize that the primary market is simply the group of
products or services delivered to consumers by a particular network
(e.g., credit cards by the VISA and MasterCard networks) and that
the secondary market includes the area, if any, in which different net-
works compete to provide the same products and services. The market
power inquiry would be subsumed in the "but for" test. The market
power of the parties would become irrelevant as the courts concen-
trated on the issue of whether access to a network is necessary to com-
pete in the primary market. Either access is essential, in which case it
should be compelled, or reasonable alternatives are available, in
149. For a summary of the confusion in the case law, see supra notes 61-105 and ac-
companying text.
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which case the joint venture should be free to institute any member-
ship rules it desires.
Under the proposed approach, the ultimate outcome of the
courts' analysis is determined by objective, readily identifiable factors.
The plaintiff's ability to prevail under the "but for" test depends upon
the existence of alternative networks and the uniqueness of the re-
sources controlled by the network. The strength of a network's rebut-
tal evidence concerning its membership rules would be apparent from
the technical requirements for participation, the capacity of the net-
work, and its history of enforcing the membership rules. The following
Sections describe how courts and regulatory agencies should evaluate
each of these factors under the proposed analysis.
V. Proving the Plaintiff's Right of Access
A potential entrant to a network joint venture should have the
burden of proving its right of access. Indeed, in order to avoid sum-
mary dismissal of its case, the plaintiff should be required to rebut an
initial presumption against compelled access. Such a presumption is
necessary to ensure that a court only interferes in a network's opera-
tions when it is absolutely necessary to protect competition. A plain-
tiff can rebut the presumption by demonstrating that, "but for" access
to the network, it could not compete effectively in the primary
market.
Courts and antitrust commentators have been unable to agree on
a consistent definition of an essential facility. Some commentators ar-
gue that a facility should not be deemed essential unless it possesses a
monopoly in the relevant market. 150 On the other hand, certain courts
have held that monopoly power is not a prerequisite and that a facility
may be deemed essential simply because it possesses certain unique
characteristics. 151 Some commentators have suggested that open ac-
cess to joint ventures should be compelled solely on the basis of their
members' market power.' 52
The "but for" test proposed in this article will help courts in
adopting a consistent standard for compelling access to particular net-
work joint ventures. Courts are very familiar with "but for" tests, hav-
ing used them for years as proof of cause-in-fact in tort actions. s5
150. See e.g., Baker, supra note 4, at 1106.
151. See infra notes 45-60 and accompanying text.
152. See Carlton & Frankel, supra note 118, at 661-62.
153. See Harry S. Gerla, Discounters and the Antitrust Laws: Faces Sometimes Should
Make Cases, 12 J. Conp. L. 1, 15 (1986).
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"But for" tests focus the courts' attention on possible alternative ex-
planations for the harm allegedly caused to a plaintiff. In network ac-
cess cases, the test forces a court to consider the alternative means by
which a firm could enter the primary market other than through the
network at issue. When there are no other effective means of entry to
the market, the "but for" test is satisfied, and the presumption against
open access rebutted. However, if the plaintiff can feasibly enter the
market individually or through an alternative network, the presump-
tion against open access will continue to apply, and the plaintiff's case
should be dismissed.
A potential entrant should prevail under the "but for" standard
whenever it can show that a network possesses monopoly power in the
relevant market. In such a case, there are no alternative gateways
through which the plaintiff can enter the market. There are, however,
other circumstances in which a firm should be able to satisfy the "but
for" test. In certain non-monopoly cases, the plaintiff should be able
to demonstrate that, "but for" access to a network, it could not com-
pete effectively in the relevant market. A network may not be the
only gateway into the primary market, but it may be so superior to
other available networks that it confers a significant competitive ad-
vantage that cannot be duplicated. However, the market power of the
joint venture members should not be sufficient, in and of itself, to
classify a joint venture as an essential facility.
(1) Monopoly Networks
A plaintiff should prevail under the "but for" standard whenever
it can demonstrate that a network is the only practical alternative
through which it can enter the primary market. The plaintiff must
show that no other current networks exist and that it is impractical for
it to form another network or to enter the market on its own. If, for
example, a network controls a large share of the primary market,
there may not be enough volume available to support another net-
work.154 Geographic conditions (such as the terrain on the west side of
the Mississippi River in Terminal Railroad Ass'n) 55 may make it im-
possible to construct a competing network, or a government entity
may have granted monopoly rights to a particular network (such as a
cable television franchise). Finally, a network may provide a type of
service that can only be made practically available to a particular in-
dustry through a single entity. For example, it is usually only feasible
154. See Baker, supra note 4, at 1095.
155. United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 390-94 (1912).
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for a single standards-setting organization to serve a particular indus-
try. Professional sports leagues also provide a type of service that can
only be effectively made available through a single organization. 156
Alternative means of entry to the primary market may be imprac-
tical because the costs of duplicating an existing network are prohibi-
tive. In MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 157 the Seventh Circuit
ordered AT&T to allow an interconnection between its local phone
lines and MCI's long-distance facilities. 58 The court pointed out that
it would "not be economically feasible" for MCI to duplicate the Bell
companies' "millions of miles of cable and line to individual homes
and businesses."' 5 9 At the time of the suit, those lines were still owned
by AT&T.160 In Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz,16' the Seventh Circuit held
that the Chicago Stadium was an essential facility to which a potential
bidder for the Chicago Bulls should have been granted access. 62 A
new arena would have cost $19 million and it was not economically
feasible for the potential bidder to incur such an expense. 63 Conse-
quently, the court held that the owners of the stadium violated section
1 when they refused to commit to lease the Stadium to the bidder. 64
(2) Non-Monopoly Networks
In certain cases, open access should be granted to networks that
do not possess monopoly power in the relevant market. A plaintiff
might be able to access another network, but if that network is infer-
ior, the plaintiff will not be able to compete on an equal basis in the
primary market. As the Fifth Circuit pointed out in Realty Multi-List,
"the question before us is not whether [the multiple listing service] has
a monopoly in the relevant market; rather, we must determine
whether [it] is of 'sufficient economic importance that exclusion re-
suits in the denial of the opportunity to compete effectively on equal
156. In Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986), the Seventh Circuit
pointed out that professional sports teams hold monopoly power within their metropolitan
areas: "[T]he Chicago metropolitan area, like virtually all of the cities in which the NBA
has franchises, cannot as a practical matter support two professional basketball franchises."
Id. at 532 (citing Liability Opinion, 1981-2 Trade Gas. (CCH) 1 64,378, at 74,757 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 28, 1981)).
157. 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
158. Id. at 1133.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. 807 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1986).
162. Id. at 541.
163. Id. at 540.
164. Id. at 543.
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terms.' ,,165 The district court in the VISA I case upheld the jury's find-
ing that Sears should be allowed to access the VISA credit card sys-
tem despite the fact that there were other available means of entering
the national credit card market-Sears, in fact, was already marketing
its own national credit card. 166
Indeed, the Supreme Court has compelled access to facilities
which lack monopoly power. In Associated Press, the Court found that
the wire news reports provided by the AP gave "many newspapers a
competitive advantage over their rivals."'167 The Court concluded that
such an advantage was sufficient to justify an open access rule, despite
the fact that there were other wire services available to newspapers. 168
The Court in Northwest Stationers stated that a purchasing coopera-
tive's membership restrictions could be held per se illegal if the ven-
ture "possesses market power or unique access to an element essential
to effective competition."'1 69 The Court's addition of the second alter-
native indicates its belief that a venture need not have monopoly
power in order to be essential.'70
It is reasonable to require access to certain networks even though
they are not the sole means of entry to the primary market. Under the
"but for" test, a plaintiff should prevail if it can demonstrate that a
network has unique cost advantages, economies of scale, or conve-
niences that are impossible for the plaintiff, or other networks, to du-
plicate. A network may possess these characteristics without being the
only gateway to the primary market. Both the VISA and MasterCard
systems, for example, are viable gateways to the national credit card
165. United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1373 (5th Cir. 1980) (foot-
note omitted) (quoting Arthur D. Austin, Real Estate Boards and Multiple Listing Systems
As Restraints of Trade, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1325, 1346 (1970)).
166. SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 956, 979 (D. Utah 1993), rev'd,
36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2600 (1995) ("VISA I"). However, in
reversing the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit found that Sears' ability to market
its own card was sufficient and that Sears' exclusion from the VISA system therefore
would not unreasonably restrict competition in the credit card market. SCFC ILC, Inc. v.
VISA U.S.A., Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 971-72 (10th Cir. 1994) ("VISA IF').
167. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 17 (1945).
168. Id. at 18.
169. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Printing Co., 472
U.S. 284, 298 (1985) ("Northwest Stationers").
170. Professor George Hay has criticized the Northwest Stationers standard, pointing
out that "the case ought to end if the co-op has no market power, because there is no
possibility that consumers can suffer any significant harm as a result of the boycott."
George Hay, Market Power in Antitrust, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 807, 812 (1992). Donald Baker
also believes that open access should only be required to networks which possess monop-
oly power. See Baker, supra note 4, at 1106.
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market. A bank, however, would not be able to participate effectively
in the market without access to at least one of those systems. Each of
these systems possesses unique cost advantages and economies of
scale that an individual bank could not duplicate.
Courts should evaluate the "but for" test from the plaintiff's per-
spective. The relevant inquiry is not whether, "but for" access to the
relevant network, any firm could participate effectively in the primary
market, but whether the plaintiff, in light of its own unique size and
competitive abilities, would be capable of participating. The Tenth
Circuit in VISA II, as well as certain commentators, argued that Sears'
entry to the VISA system need not have been compelled because
Sears had the financial and marketing muscle to enter the credit card
market on its own.171 Sears, in fact, was already marketing its own
proprietary charge card. However, this argument overlooks the fact
that access to the VISA and MasterCard networks is necessary, even
for large financial institutions. 172 The VISA and MasterCard networks
are essential not only because of their cost advantages and economies
of scale, but also because they offer consumers unique conveniences.
VISA and MasterCard are accepted by merchants and banks through-
out the world. Indeed, these systems have created a special identity
for each of their brands that cannot be duplicated, even by firms with
the resources of Sears.173
A new on-line computer service developed by Microsoft is an-
other example of a non-monopoly network whose unique convenience
cannot be duplicated, even by relatively large firms. Microsoft plans to
provide a gateway to its on-line service for home banking and shop-
ping (the "Microsoft Network") through its new "Windows 95" oper-
ating system. Personal computer users can access the Microsoft
Network simply by clicking on an icon in the Windows 95 operating
system.174 Operators of other on-line networks, including America
Online, Prodigy, and CompuServe, can provide consumers with alter-
native means of accessing their on-line services. They can, for exam-
ple, mail users free floppy disks containing access codes, give disks
171. See 36 F.3d at 972; Evans & Schmalensee, supra note 132, at 883-85.
172. Citicorp, in fact, is a member of the VISA system. See 36 F.3d at 967.
173. It could be argued that the VISA and MasterCard credit cards should each be
treated as separate markets because of their brand differentiation. In a recent case, the
FrC held that there are distinct markets for branded soft drinks separate from generic
brands. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co., No. 9215, 1994 FTC LEXIS 185 (Aug. 31, 1994) (find-
ing that branded carbonated soft drinks do not compete with non-branded drinks).
174. See Bart Ziegler et al., Microsoft Faces Antitrust-Issue Queries Again, WALL ST. J.,
June 9, 1995, at Al, A4.
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away at retail stores, or provide the relevant code on the Internet. 175
Despite these alternatives, however, the Microsoft Network is likely
to be preferred by consumers because it can be accessed as a part of
the Windows operating system, which is already used on more than
eighty-five percent of all personal computers. 176 The Justice Depart-
ment is thus investigating Microsoft's plans to "bundle" the Microsoft
Network with Windows 95.177 The Department may rely on the essen-
tial facilities doctrine to argue that the Network should be offered sep-
arately from the operating system or that the other on-line services
should be allowed equal access to Windows 95 for their own
networks.178
Although certain non-monopoly networks may be deemed essen-
tial for effective competition in the relevant market, market power
alone should not be sufficient to satisfy the "but for" test.1 79 Access
should not be compelled to a non-essential network, even if its mem-
bers collectively have a large market share. In such cases, the benefi-
cial effects of compelled access in the primary market do not outweigh
the adverse effects in the secondary market. There would, by defini-
tion, be alternative gateways to the primary market. Instead of joining
the network with market power, a potential entrant could join a
smaller network or enter the primary market on its own. Indeed, in
such a case, a rule of compulsory access would exacerbate market
power concentration problems. Firms would be more likely to seek
access to the dominant network, thereby further increasing its market
power, rather than entering the primary market through an alterna-
tive gateway. For example, following the Supreme Court's open access
decree in Associated Press, newspapers abandoned other wire service
networks in favor of AP, ultimately giving AP a near monopoly over
international wire service news.' 80
175. Id.
176. See Justice Takes New Tack in Microsoft Inquiry, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, June 23,
1995, at 3C.
177. Id.
178. The President of America Online has characterized Windows 95 as an essential
facility: "[iun the new digital world, the operating system for computers is similar to the dial
tone for telephones. You can't call anybody without going through the dial tone, and you
can't use software or a service without going through the operating system." Steve Lohr,
Microsoft Defends Its On-Line Plans, N.Y. TIMEs, June 10, 1995, at 3, 15.
179. Some commentators have argued, however, that the members' collective market
power should be sufficient to require a network joint venture to justify its access restric-
tions. See Carlton & Frankel, supra note 118, at 661-62.
180. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
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The collective market power of the members of a network joint
venture may, however, have some relevance under the "but for" test.
It may, for example, indicate whether a potential entrant can dupli-
cate certain unique features of a non-monopoly network. If there are
few firms in the market that are not already included in the venture, it
will be difficult for a potential entrant to find enough partners to form
a viable competing venture. If, however, several relatively large firms
remain outside a particular network, they may be able to combine
their resources effectively to duplicate the network joint venture.
A potential entrant, therefore, should be able to rebut the initial
presumption against open access by proving either that a network is
the only gateway to the primary market or that the network possesses
certain unique advantages of cost, scale, or convenience which make it
impossible for the entrant or other networks to duplicate. If the po-
tential entrant fails to rebut the presumption against open access, the
court's inquiry need go no further, and the case should be dismissed.
If, however, the potential entrant is able to rebut the presumption, a
court should proceed to consider the reasonableness of any member-
ship rules that preclude the entrant from joining the network joint
venture.
VI. Proving the Reasonableness of Access Restrictions
A. The Courts' Ability to Fashion Appropriate Remedies
Most networks are not essential for effective competition in the
relevant market and can therefore adopt any membership rules they
like without running afoul of the antitrust laws. When a network is not
an essential gateway, competition is unaffected by exclusionary mem-
bership rules. Members who are excluded from such a venture can
simply choose to enter the relevant market in another way, either on
their own or through an alternative network.
However, once a court determines that access to a network is
necessary in order for a firm to compete effectively in the relevant
market, the network's membership rules become relevant. The court
must then review those rules to ensure that they are no broader than
necessary to promote the venture's legitimate objectives. In the course
of that review, a court may void inappropriate membership rules and
determine the terms of new membership rules that should apply to the
network.
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Contrary to the views of certain commentators, 181 courts and an-
titrust regulatory agencies are well-equipped to determine the appro-
priate membership rules for essential networks. Regulation has long
been considered an appropriate response to monopoly power.18 Anti-
trust regulation of network monopolies is preferable to the industry-
specific regulation undertaken by such administrative agencies as the
Federal Communications Commission, Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, and Department of Transportation. The goal of antitrust regula-
tion is to promote general consumer welfare. No particular competitor
is favored over another, as is often the case with traditional statutory
regulation.183 Furthermore, in contrast to administrative regulations,
which continue indefinitely, antitrust judgments and consent decrees
can be tailored to last only as long as a need for open access exists. A
judgment or consent decree can provide that it will expire when the
relevant technology changes or when other circumstances cause a par-
ticular network to lose its status as an essential gateway. Alternatively,
a court can retain jurisdiction over a network and review a decree at a
later date to determine whether it should be modified due to changes
in markets and technologies.
Courts can use their broad equitable powers to fashion flexible
remedies that leave the maximum possible discretion with the joint
venture partners to determine the specific terms for admission of new
members. In Terminal Railroad Ass'n, for example, the Supreme
Court's decree was general enough to permit the joint venture to im-
plement its own membership rules.184 The decree gave the associa-
tion's members the discretion to admit members "upon such just and
reasonable terms as shall place such applying company upon a plane
of equality in respect of benefits and burdens with the present propri-
etary companies."'1 85 The Supreme Court's decree in Associated Press
allowed the AP to place conditions on membership as long as they did
181. See, e.g., Lohr, supra note 112, at E16 (citing antitrust specialists who oppose ex-
cessive government intervention in high-tech markets); Baker, supra note 4, at 1076.
182. See Guerin-Calvert, supra note 110, at 6 ("In many cases where natural monopoly
characteristics have led to a single provider of services in a network industry, some form of
price or entry regulation has been adopted at the state or federal level.").
183. Administrative agencies often become the captives of the industries they were
designed to regulate and end up defending them from competition. The FCC, for example,
attempted to keep television networks out of the motion picture business until a federal
court overturned the FCC's rules. Telephone and cable companies have lobbied the FCC
to block rules exposing them to competition. See Edmund L. Andrews, Has the FCC Be-
come Obsolete?, N.Y. TimFss, June 12, 1995, at D1, D6.
184. United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 410-411 (1912).
185. Id. at 411.
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not preclude admission simply on the basis of a firm's status as a com-
petitor of a current member.18 6 The lower federal courts have fol-
lowed the Supreme Court in decreeing flexible terms of network
access. In Realty Multi-List, the Fifth Circuit interpreted Terminal
Railroad Ass'n as demonstrating that courts may determine reason-
able means of ensuring open access to essential facilities. 8 7 The Fifth
Circuit found that it could require the multiple listing service to re-
form its bylaws to permit applicants to become members upon "just
and reasonable terms."' 88
In several recent cases involving mergers and joint ventures, the
federal antitrust regulatory agencies have negotiated consent decrees
providing for a flexible means of ensuring equal access by all competi-
tors to resources critical to competition in particular markets. 89 The
decrees do not impose traditional structural remedies such as divest-
ment or dissolution. 190 They permit the transactions at issue to pro-
ceed but require that the parties engage in certain conduct on an
ongoing basis to ensure that third parties can use essential facilities on
equal terms.191 In industries where competitive conditions are rapidly
evolving, the decrees expire within a relatively short period.192 These
186. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 21 (1945).
187. United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1386 (5th Cir. 1980).
188. Id. at 1387.
189. See Tele-Communications, Inc., 59 Fed. Reg. 24,723 (Dep't Justice 1994) (pro-
posed final judgment and competitive impact statement) (permitting merger of companies
controlling cable television and programming operations on condition that, during five-
year period, merged company not discriminate against unaffiliated programmers; accord-
ing to the Antitrust Division, "the length of this term reflects the Department's recognition
that this industry is one that has experienced major changes in technologies"); Eli Lilly &
Co., No. C-3594, 1995 FTC LEXIS 225 (July 28, 1995) (permitting acquisition of pharmacy
benefit manager by pharmacy company, on condition that merged company maintain an
"open formulary," which would recommend to pharmacies, physicians, and third-party
payors the purchase of any drugs recommended by an independent committee of health
care professionals); AT&T Corp., 59 Fed. Reg. 44,158 (Dep't Justice 1994) (proposed final
judgment and competitive impact statement) (permitting merger between AT&T and Mc-
Caw Cellular Communications on condition that, for ten years, merged company provide
long-distance competitors of AT&T with equal access to McCaw's cellular telephone sub-
scribers; decree may be modified upon a showing that "certain types of services have de-
veloped as effective competitive alternatives to cellular services"); United States v. MCI
Communications Corp., 1994-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,730 (D.D.C. 1994) (permitting ajoint venture between MCI and British Telecommunications on condition that, for five
years, joint venture provide regular reports to the Department of Justice so that Depart-
ment can monitor whether any of MCI's competitors are being discriminated against with
respect to access to the joint venture facilities).
190. See cases cited supra note 189.
191. See decrees cited supra note 189.
192. See supra note 189.
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consent decrees demonstrate that antitrust regulators can devise effec-
tive means of ensuring open access to essential facilities without un-
duly interfering in legitimate network operations.
Thus, once a plaintiff has proven that open access is necessary to
preserve competition in the primary market, courts and regulatory
agencies should not hesitate to order remedies that appropriately ad-
dress the access issue. After a court determines that open access is
appropriate, it should undertake two remedial steps. First, it should
void any membership restrictions that are not ancillary to a network
joint venture's efficiency objectives. Second, it should impose certain
affirmative obligations on a network joint venture to ensure that it is
operated in an open manner in the future.
B. Voiding Improper Membership Rules
A court should preclude any membership rules of an essential
network that are broader than required to ensure the network's effi-
ciency. If access to a network is required in order for a firm to com-
pete in the primary market, the network should not be able to exclude
third parties for any reason other than to maintain its efficiency or to
protect its members' proprietary rights. Membership rules that are
broader than necessary for a network's efficiency objectives may sim-
ply be designed as a direct or indirect means of excluding competitors
from the primary market.
Rules setting forth the technical qualifications for joint venture
members should be the easiest to justify. In order to preserve their
efficiency, network joint ventures must be allowed to adopt and en-
force objective qualifications for their members. A firm should not be
allowed into a network if it does not have the necessary technical abil-
ities or financial wherewithal. A new member must be capable of pay-
ing any reasonable admission fees as well as its continuing share of the
cost of operating a network. It must also possess the technical abilities
and professional licenses and qualifications required to participate ef-
fectively in the network. For example, a real estate broker must be
licensed by a state before it can join a multiple listing service, a televi-
sion station must have approval from the FCC before it can broadcast
over a cable television network, and a bank must have Federal Re-
serve approval to participate in certain electronic funds transfers. 193
A network may also require that there be technical compatibility
between its systems and those of a potential entrant. A network
193. See Baker, supra note 4, at 1081 n.312, 1097.
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should not be required to change its systems to accommodate new
members. If a bank, for example, wishes to join a national credit card
system, it must ensure that its computer systems will interchange ef-
fectively with those of the credit card network.
In order to be upheld, however, technical qualifications for joint
venture membership should contain objective standards that can be
applied equally to all potential entrants. Vague and subjective stan-
dards that leave wide latitude for interpretation by the members of
the network joint venture should not be acceptable. In Realty Multi-
List, for example, the Fifth Circuit voided a real estate multiple listing
service's vague requirement that a member have a "favorable credit
report and business reputation."' 94
Limits on the number of firms that can join a network joint ven-
ture are reasonable when they are designed to prevent the venture
from exceeding its natural capacity. If a joint venture's membership
levels are already at or near capacity, compelled access could cause
the network's efficiency to decline or could require the network to
build costly new facilities. 195 In such cases, a network has a compelling
argument against the plaintiff's admission. 196 Many network joint ven-
tures, however, do not have inherent capacity limitations and can ad-
mit new members with minimal disruption. Indeed, some networks
become more valuable when their membership increases. In a tele-
phone network, for example, users can make more calls as more cus-
tomers are added to the system. Since the necessary infrastructure is
already in place, the incremental cost of adding a new member is less
than the incremental benefit of having an additional user of the net-
work.197 Credit card and ATM systems also benefit from the admis-
sion of new members. An ATM system is more attractive to
consumers if several different charge cards can be used at a single ac-
cess point. The district court in NaBanco I pointed out the advantages
of credit card systems with large memberships: "[T]he more cardhold-
ers in the system, the more attractive the system is to merchants ....
[T]he more merchants in the system, the more attractive the card is to
cardholders."' 98
194. United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1381 (5th Cir. 1980).
195. See Baker, supra note 4, at 1110.
196. Id.
197. See Guerin-Calvert, supra note 110, at 4-5.
198. National Bancard Crop. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1231, 1260 (S.D. Fla.
1984), affd, 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 923 (1986) ("NaBanco P').
November 1995] NETWORK JOINT VENTURES
A network joint venture should be allowed to charge its members
reasonable fees. In order to prevent free-riding, admission fees should
be calculated to pay the original partners a reasonable premium for
their up-front risk. Members can also be charged for their share of the
network's continuing operating costs. Unreasonably high fees that are
unrelated to such costs, however, should not be permitted. In Realty
Multi-List, for example, the Fifth Circuit voided a rule requiring mem-
bers of a real estate multiple listing service to purchase a share of
stock at a price determined by the service's Board of Directors.1 99 The
court pointed out that the requirement bore no relationship to the
costs of operating the service.200
A bald prohibition against the admission of competitors of cur-
rent network members is difficult to justify.201 A network should not
be allowed to exclude a potential entrant on the ground that it would
be disruptive or that the current members would find it difficult to
work with the firm.202 Indeed, it is often the disruptive newcomer who
has the most innovative ideas for reducing costs, improving quality,
and otherwise enhancing consumer welfare in a particular market. A
network may argue that a prohibition on the admission of competitors
is necessary to prevent them from accessing the confidential informa-
tion and know-how of the current members. In many cases, however,
there are less restrictive alternatives for protecting such information.
A network may, for example, be able to create internal "firewalls" to
prevent competitors from obtaining each other's proprietary
information.
However, in certain cases, members may require access to each
other's confidential information in order to participate in the network
joint venture, and there may not be any way to protect that informa-
tion from disclosure to new entrants. In those cases, rules against the
admission of competitors may be justified. The members of a purchas-
199. 629 F.2d at 1386-88.
200. Id. at 1387
201. Courts have voided rules that expressly prohibit the admission of competitors or
grant current members the right to veto the admission of new members. In Associated
Press, the Supreme Court voided a bylaw giving newspapers a veto right over the admis-
sion of competitors. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 21-23 (1945). The district
court in VISA I held that the VISA credit card system could not adopt a bylaw prohibiting
the owner of a competing proprietary credit card from joining the system. SCFC ILC, Inc.
v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 956, 986 (D. Utah 1993), rev'd, 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2600 (1995) ("VISA r').
202. But see Baker, supra note 4, at 1077 (arguing that "[a] compulsory access order
simply moves the business conflicts between the joint venture partners and the 'outsider' to
the joint venture's governance institutions").
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ing network, for example, may need to share proprietary information
on suppliers, purchasing costs and requirements for certain types of
items. The members of the network may have legitimate reasons for
denying access to such information to competitors who could use it for
their own benefit.
However, it will be extremely difficult for a network joint venture
to justify exclusivity rules that prohibit its members from joining com-
peting networks. Such rules can significantly limit competition in the
secondary market.203 Under such circumstances, new members may
have to abandon their current membership in other network joint ven-
tures and, in the future, will be "locked in" to an incumbent
network.204
203. See Carlton & Salop, supra note 115, at 29. Some commentators argue, however,
that network exclusivity provisions actually promote competition between networks. They
point out that, in the absence of such provisions, networks will have overlapping member-
ships and thus will be more likely to enjoy a cooperative than a competitive relationship.
See David S. Evans & Richard L. Schmalensee, The Economics of the Payment Card Indus-
try, NAT'L ECON. RESEARCH Ass'N, INC. (1993); David A. Balto, Antitrust and Credit Card
Joint Ventures, 47 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 266 (1993). In the VISA I case, VISA argued
that allowing Sears to join the VISA system while marketing its own proprietary Discover
Card would reduce competition between the VISA system and Discover Card. See Carlton
& Salop, supra note 115, at 41. The district court pointed out that competition would not
be eliminated, since Sears would continue to vigorously market the Discover Card. 819 F.
Supp. at 996. Furthermore, as illustrated by the credit card market, non-exclusivity rules
promote rather than eliminate competition between networks. Since 1973, most members
of the VISA and MasterCard systems have been able to join both networks. As a result,
card-issuing banks may now "shift their card-issuing efforts from one brand to another as
relative costs change," thus giving each system a greater incentive to provide better service
to bank members at a lower cost. Carlton & Frankel, supra note 118, at 666. "PLUS" and
"Cirrus," the two largest national ATM networks, currently allow a single ATM to be ac-
cessed by holders of PLUS cards and Cirrus cards, and such duality does not appear to
have reduced competition between these two ATM networks. See Daniel I. Prywes, ATM-
Related Antitrust Developments, 46 Bus. LAw. 1063, 1064-65 (1991).
204. Although the VISA system does not prohibit membership in the MasterCard net-
work, it does preclude its members from developing their own proprietary charge cards.
819 F. Supp. at 977. The district court in the VISA I case pointed out that, because a VISA
membership is highly profitable, a bank is not likely to risk losing that membership by
developing its own proprietary card. Id. at 977, 986; see also North American Soccer
League v. National Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1261 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1074 (1982) (striking down NFL rule that prohibited its members from obtaining own-
ership in competing leagues on grounds that the rule restricted ability of league members
to engage in competition in the sports market).
See also Carlton & Salop, supra note 115, at 29 ("Exclusivity requirements force mem-
bers of the venture to make all-or-nothing choices between obtaining their inputs from the
venture or from input market competitors. This can make the decision to obtain inputs
from alternative sources more costly, and thereby decrease demand for the inputs supplied
by these alternative competitors."(footnote omitted)).
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The pace of technological change is very rapid in many markets
controlled by networks. Electronic networks are particularly likely to
be superseded as a result of technological innovations. The accelerat-
ing pace of improvements in semiconductor capacity and speed can
rob dominant networks of their market share rather quickly.20 5 Exclu-
sivity rules preclude members of a joint venture from forming net-
works to take advantage of new technology. Indeed, several types of
networks have already lost their monopoly power as a result of new
developments in electronic technology.206 As long as the members of
a network are not expressly foreclosed from joining a competing net-
work, they will have a natural incentive to participate in new networks
designed to develop or commercialize a superior technology.20 7 The
rewards, both in terms of "in-house" use by the members and the abil-
ity to charge a fee for use by third parties, are so great that firms are
not likely to forego the opportunity to participate in the development
of a promising new network. By precluding the members of a network
joint venture from taking advantage of such an opportunity, exclusiv-
ity rules limit competition that would otherwise exist in secondary
markets.
Exclusivity rules are usually not necessary to ensure a venture's
efficiency. The VISA and MasterCard networks, for example, have
operated quite effectively without such rules since 1973.208 A network
may argue that an exclusivity rule is justified by the need to protect its
205. Because of the importance of common technical standards, industries based on
technology can spawn monopolies quickly and, just as quickly, eliminate them. IBM was
able to decree the technical standards for most personal computers when they first came
into general use in the early 1980s. See Edmund L. Andrews, Technology Monopolies Are
Big, but Often Brittle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1995, at E6. IBM permitted Microsoft to de-
velop the MS-DOS operating system for all of its personal computers and, as other compa-
nies in the industry followed suit, MS-DOS became the standard for personal computers.
The continuation of the current market dominance of Microsoft, however, is no more as-
sured than that of IBM ten years ago. As new computer programs are developed to take
advantage of enhanced computing capacity, new standards, ten times or even one hundred
times better, are likely to supplant the current standards. Id.
206. New technology allowing for direct broadcasts from satellites to living rooms has
the potential to break up the monopolies of local cable companies, and cellular telephone
technology is providing a wireless alternative to the monopolies of the Baby Bells. See
Landler, supra note 130, at 19.
207. Thus, the absence of an exclusivity requirement has helped to save joint ventures
from antitrust liability in certain cases. For example, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441
U.S. 1, 24 (1979), the Supreme Court upheld a blanket licensing arrangement for copy-
righted musical compositions. The Court emphasized that the arrangement did not prohibit
the composers from licensing their compositions separately from the association. Id. at 12,
24.
208. See infra note 210 and accompanying text.
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proprietary know-how from disclosure to a rival network. There are,
however, less restrictive means of protecting a network's know-how,
such as rules requiring members to maintain the confidentiality of
such information.
A network's history of enforcing membership rules may affect the
persuasiveness of its arguments in favor of such rules. Courts should
give greater deference to rules that have been maintained consistently
by a network since its inception. However, courts should look with
suspicion on exclusionary rules adopted shortly after a potential en-
trant's application for membership. If a network was previously struc-
tured in an open manner, it suggests that the members are probably
not concerned about problems such as free-riding, capacity limita-
tions, or technical qualifications.209 When restrictive access rules are
implemented in response to a potential entrant's membership applica-
tion, a court may conclude that members are not attempting to ensure
the efficiency of the network but are merely trying to exclude a poten-
tial competitor from the primary market.210
C. Imposing Affirmative Obligations
In addition to voiding improper membership rules, a court can
affirmatively require a network joint venture to implement new rules
that will ensure that the network is operated in an open manner in the
future. For example, a court may simply require, as the Supreme
Court did in Terminal Railroad Ass'n, that a network admit new mem-
bers on the same terms as the original members.211 Such decrees are
the least intrusive and leave the maximum discretion with the parties
to determine the specific membership rules to use in the future. In
certain cases, however, courts may need to be more specific in order
to ensure that a network and its members are not unduly harmed by
an open access decree. A court could, for example, provide that, as a
condition of membership, a network may charge a fee calculated to
reimburse current operating costs and to give the original members a
reasonable premium on their initial investments.212 In order to ensure
209. See Carlton & Salop, supra note 115, at 16-17.
210. In the VISA I case, for example, VISA's largest member, Citibank, issued its own
proprietary cards, and VISA had never complained about Citibank's free-riding. SCFC
ILC, Inc. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 956, 966 (D. Utah 1993), rev'd, 36 F.3d 958
(10th Cir. 1994), cert denied 115 S. Ct. 2600 (1995) ("VISA 1"'). VISA only adopted an
exclusionary rule when Sears applied for admission to the network. IL at 963-64.
211. United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 411 (1912).
212. Professor Ross has suggested that, for major league baseball, Congress could
adopt a regulatory standard that allowed a new team to join the league if it compensated
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that competition in the secondary market is not unduly precluded as a
result of an open access order, a court may require that a network
expressly allow its members to join competing networks.213
Courts should, however, avoid imposing certain onerous obliga-
tions on network joint ventures. A network, for example, should not
usually be required to make costly changes in its systems and operat-
ing procedures to accommodate a potential entrant that operates on
different standards. In most cases, the entrant, not the network,
should implement the technical changes required to participate in the
network. In any event, few courts have the expertise to dictate the
specific technical standards and tolerances that a network must follow
in order to maintain open access. 214
Finally, in certain cases, a court should distinguish between com-
pelled access to a network's facilities and to its trademarks. While cer-
tain trademarks may constitute an inseparable part of a network (e.g.,
the VISA and MasterCard marks), in other cases it may be feasible to
allow a potential entrant to use a network's facilities without its trade-
mark. In such cases, a court should protect the goodwill that partners
have created in the trademark and decline to order the compulsory
licensing of the trademark.21 5
VII. Examples of Access Decrees Under the
Proposed Approach
It should not be difficult for courts to determine when open ac-
cess to a network joint venture should be allowed under the approach
proposed in this Article. In many cases, it will be obvious that a poten-
tial entrant should prevail under the "but for" test. The "but for" test
the existing owners for any resulting reduction in their revenues. See Ross, supra note 111,
at 707-08. Donald Baker, however, believes that the determination of a new entrant's pro-
portionate share of previous costs incurred by the network partners is "a subject on which
philosopher-kings and their accounting equivalents could have many hours of learned de-
bate." Baker, supra note 4, at 1109.
213. For a discussion of how exclusivity rules can restrict competition in the secondary
market, see supra notes 112-27 and accompanying text.
214. See Baker, supra note 4, at 1118.
215. Compulsory trademark licensing has not been accepted as an antitrust remedy
because it unfairly deprives the owner of the goodwill created in the mark. See 4 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 31.26(6), at 31-154 (3d ed. 1992) ("[I1n no reported private antitrust litigation has a plain-
tiff received the sanction of compulsory trademark licensing."); see also Cott Beverage
Corp. v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 146 F. Supp. 300, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), appeal dis-
missed, 243 F.2d 795 (2d Cir. 1957) (rejecting compulsory licensing of "Canada Dry" trade-
mark as remedy for section 1 violation).
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should always be met when a network has monopoly power in the
relevant market. Even in non-monopoly cases, it should be clear from
the type of resources controlled by a network whether it will be
deemed essential to competition in the primary market.
The balance should usually shift in favor of open access to tele-
communications and utility networks. Such networks often possess a
monopoly in the relevant market, resulting from either an outright
grant of a monopoly by a government entity or the impracticality of
duplicating the network's facilities. 216 A potential user of a natural gas
pipeline, electrical transmission system, or telephone or cable televi-
sion system should usually be able to prove that, "but for" access to
the network, it could not compete in the relevant market. Telecommu-
nications and utility networks will also find it difficult to prove that
restrictive membership rules are necessary to promote their effi-
ciency.2 17 Indeed, in the cable television market, open access usually
promotes the business interests of cable systems as well as providers
of programs. Providers such as film studios and television producers
"want to sell their products through as many pipelines as possible,"
while cable television systems, in order to increase their value to cus-
tomers, want to have access to as many different types of programs as
their capacity will permit.218 Thus, in most cases, cable television
systems should not be allowed to deny access to providers of pro-
gramming.219 Such systems should only be able to exclude a quali-
216. The monopolies of the Bell companies over local telephone service may, however,
be ending, as MCI builds local fiber-optic networks to bypass the local lines of the Bell
companies. John J. Keller & Laura Landro, MCI Agrees to Inject As Much As $2 Billion in
News Corp. in Data Highway Venture, WALL ST. J., May 11, 1995, at A3, A7. The monop-
oly power of local cable television may also be threatened by direct satellite broadcast
systems and by the possible entry of telephone companies into local cable markets. See
supra note 206. If the telecommunications bill currently pending in Congress is enacted,
local utilities could also end up competing with local telephone and cable television net-
works. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
217. Indeed, under the essential facilities doctrine, courts have traditionally required
such networks to make their facilities available on non-discriminatory terms. See Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377-79 (1973), reh'g denied, 411 U.S. 910 (1973)
(holding electric utility's refusal to transfer power per se illegal); MCI Communications
Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081, 1133 (7th Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983) (stat-
ing local Bell companies have a duty to provide telecommunications interconnection to
MCI).
218. See Keller & Landro, supra note 216, at A3.
219. There are an increasing number of network joint ventures in the cable television
area to which access would likely be compelled under the approach proposed in this Arti-
cle. Time-Warner and U.S. West, for example, have formed a joint venture that will com-
bine their cable and programming capabilities in a new communications network. See Mary
Lu Camevale et al., Cable Phone Link Is Promising Gamble: U.S. West Move Puts Pressure
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fled provider when they have reached their practical capacity
limits.22 0
Sports leagues are another type of monopoly network for which
the balance is likely to fall in favor of open access. The NFL, NBA,
NHL, and Major League Baseball all possess monopoly power within
their area of professional sports.221 Free of any real threat of entry
from rival leagues, these organizations have been able to create an
artificial scarcity of professional teams. As a result, fans in many ma-
jor cities have lost the opportunity to have their own teams. In cities
that already have teams, the leagues have been able to use their mo-
nopoly power to extract enormous subsidies. Because of the scarcity
of teams, cities realize that they will probably not be able to replace a
team that relocates. They are therefore willing to divert scarce re-
sources to build new stadiums and provide other taxpayer-supported
subsidies to induce the teams to remain in their current homes.222
Under the approach proposed in this Article, courts could require
the NFL, NBA, NHL, and Major League Baseball to grant franchises
to qualified cities.223 If such a rule of open access prevailed, the
leagues would no longer be able to extort monopoly profits from cities
desperate to acquire or maintain a major league franchise. Cities de-
siring a franchise could easily prove that, "but for" access to a league,
they could not participate in the relevant sport. In order to avoid the
granting of a franchise to a city, the league would have to prove the
reasonableness of its rules limiting the number of teams. A league
on Its Rivals, WALL ST. J., May 18, 1993, at B1. Such joint ventures are likely to increase if
Congress passes the pending telecommunications bill, which allows local utilities and tele-
phone companies to compete in providing cable television and on-line computer services.
See Bill Richards, Trojan Horse? In the Race to Wire Your Home, Don't Rule Out the
Electric Utilities, WALL ST. J., June 19, 1995, at R24.
220. Given the new fiber-optic technologies that make it possible to deliver up to 150
channels by cable, such capacity limits may not be exceeded for some time by most cable
systems. See Landler, supra note 130, at 19.
221. See Ross, supra note 111, at 660-61 (noting that the NFL and Major League Base-
ball are able to create artificial scarcity because of their monopoly power). The NFL, for
example, achieved a monopoly when it eliminated its only rival, the American Football
League, through a 1970 merger. See Jon Morgan, Ancient Architecture: Booming Business
Has Turned Once-Heralded 2-Sport Stadiums into Cities' Discarded Dinosaurs, CLEV.
PLAIN DEALER, July 3, 1995, at 6D.
222. Ross, supra note 111, at 656-57. During the last three years, American cities have
spent more than $1 billion on building or renovating sports stadiums, and they are ex-
pected to spend another $6 billion during the next five years. See Morgan, supra note 221,
at 6D.
223. Because the Supreme Court granted baseball an antitrust exemption in the case of
Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922), Congress would have
to remove the exemption before this approach could be applied to professional baseball.
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might argue that not all cities have a sufficient population or economic
base to adequately support a team. However, a recent study indicates
that at least eleven more metropolitan areas in the United States
could support major league baseball teams. 224 A league may also ar-
gue that expansion would dilute player quality and thus decrease fan
interest. Such interest, however, appears to be more a function of the
competitive balance in a league than of the level of the average qual-
ity of play. Indeed, overall attendance at NFL, NHL and Major
League Baseball games increased after each league expansion, despite
the decrease in player quality that might be expected from such an
expansion.225
Credit card networks do not possess monopoly power in their
markets, and yet the balance should usually tip in favor of compelled
access to such systems. There are two national credit card systems and
several types of proprietary cards that are issued by single firms.
Although neither the VISA nor the MasterCard systems holds a mo-
nopoly in the credit card market, a prospective issuer cannot partici-
pate effectively in the market without access to at least one of these
systems. Both the VISA and MasterCard systems have achieved econ-
omies of scale and scope that cannot be duplicated. Because of their
universal acceptance, the VISA and MasterCard credit cards are also
uniquely convenient to consumers. It would be impossible for a pro-
spective card issuer, whether it be a small bank or a large financial
institution, to match those advantages. Therefore, a potential entrant
should prevail easily under the "but for" test. Furthermore, the credit
card systems' arguments in favor of restrictive membership rules are
not strong. There are no apparent limits to the ability of a credit card
system to admit new members. There are approximately six thousand
current members of the VISA and MasterCard systems, 226 and admis-
sion of additional members should not strain the systems' capacities.
A credit card network, in fact, becomes more valuable to its members
224. The study identified the following criteria as indicative of a metropolitan area's
ability to support a team: a population over one million, a high percentage of men between
18 and 54, a per capita income above the national average, high population growth, and a
high proportion of businesses with more than 500 employees. Using these criteria, the
study concluded that at least 39 metropolitan areas should be able to support a team, as
compared to the 28 that currently have a major league franchise. See TY Ahmad-Taylor,
Who Is Major Enough for the Major Leagues?, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 2, 1995, at E5. Addition-
ally, Professor Ross argues that baseball should expand to any market in which an average
team can draw at least 1.5 million fans per season. See Ross, supra note 111, at 663-64.
225. Ross, supra note 110, at 664-65.
226. See SCFC ILC, Inc. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 956, 994 (D. Utah 1993),
rev'd, 36 F.3d 958 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2600 (1995) ("VISA P').
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as more merchants and issuers are added to the system.227 Finally, the
VISA and MasterCard systems have traditionally operated with open
admission policies, 228 indicating that current members have not been
concerned with any free-rider problems that might result from the ad-
mission of new members.
The arguments in favor of open access to a new joint venture for
on-line use of credit cards are also quite compelling. VISA, Master-
Card, and Microsoft recently announced the formation of a joint ven-
ture designed to establish an industry-wide standard for electronic
credit card transactions. Under the new system, consumers will be
able to register their credit card numbers and use their cards to order
merchandise or information through the Internet.229 Unlike the
Microsoft Network, for which alternatives are available,230 the new
credit card joint venture would constitute a monopoly. Since the new
venture will establish the standard for on-line credit card transactions,
there will be no other means by which credit card issuers can partici-
pate in the on-line credit card network. Furthermore, the joint venture
would not have a strong case for excluding new members. The joint
venture should be able to establish security procedures that prevent
other card issuers from accessing proprietary information of VISA or
MasterCard (such as the names and billing histories of credit card cus-
tomers). Thus, under the proposed approach, the issuers of the Dis-
cover, American Express, Diner's Club, Carte Blanche, and other
proprietary credit cards should be able to gain access to the new joint
venture.231
In the case of ATM networks, the balance is more likely to shift
against open access. It may be difficult for a potential entrant to prove
that it must be admitted to a particular ATM system in order to com-
pete in the market for ATM cards. ATM networks have not achieved
economies of scale and scope as great as those of credit card networks.
It may therefore be possible for a potential ATM card issuer to join
227. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
228. See 819 F. Supp. at 962-64.
229. See Hansell, supra note 1, at 19.
230. See supra notes 174-176 and accompanying text.
231. Initial indications are that the joint venture will be open to other card companies.
See Hansell, supra note 1, at 9. Recently, several joint ventures have been formed to estab-
lish new electronic technologies. If successful, these ventures may be deemed essential to
effective competition in their markets, and access would have to be granted to qualified
participants under the approach proposed in this Article. Such ventures include a consor-
tium attempting to develop a new form of "high definition" digital television and an alli-
ance to establish a new technical standard for videodisks. See Andrews & Brinkley, supra
note 1, § 3, at 1, 6; Jared Sandberg, Don't Get Up, WALL ST. J., June 19, 1995, at R8.
[Vol. 47
NETWORK JOINT VENTURES
with others to form a new network rather than accessing an existing
network. ATM networks may also have better arguments in favor of
restrictive membership rules. Unlike credit card systems, ATM net-
works have not consistently followed an open access policy since their
inception.P 2 The members of an ATM network may thus have a
stronger case that access limitations are necessary to protect their in-
vestment and to prevent free-riding by third parties on their know-
how.
Microsoft would also have a strong argument against its competi-
tors' access to the Microsoft Network.233 America On-Line, Prodigy,
and CompuServe might be able to prevail under the "but for" stan-
dard by pointing out Microsoft's dominance in computer operating
systems. Since Microsoft's "Windows" system is currently used on
over eighty-five percent of personal computers,2 34 the Microsoft Net-
work may become the most convenient gateway to the market for on-
line services23-5 The burden would therefore shift to Microsoft to jus-
tify any access restrictions. Microsoft has some compelling arguments
in favor of limiting access to its network. It may, for example, be diffi-
cult for Microsoft to grant access in a manner that protects its proprie-
tary know-how from disclosure to its competitors. Microsoft could
also point out the unfairness of allowing its competitors to free-ride on
its investment in the new on-line network. If Microsoft implemented
restrictive access rules from the inception of the network, its free-rider
arguments would be even stronger.
Despite the many instances in which open access would prevail
under the approach proposed in this Article, compelled access to a
network joint venture would remain the exception rather than the
rule. Today, American firms are entering into joint ventures at an un-
precedented rate,23 6 and most of those ventures would not be classi-
232. See Baker, supra note 4, at 1061-62.
233. For a description of this service, see supra notes 229-230 and accompanying text.
234. See G. Christian Hill, et al., Undone Deak Microsoft Drops Bid for Intuit-a Vic-
tory for Antitrust Agency, WALL ST. J., May 22, 1995, at Al.
235. Jeffrey Tarter, the publisher of a software industry newsletter, recently pointed
out that the Microsoft Network may even take the place of the Internet. He stated: "I think
the Microsoft Network is going to become the Internet of 1996," and the "Internet will
vanish almost as quickly as it surged into prominence." Peter H. Lewis, A Physicist Is
Propelling Microsoft into Cyberspace, N.Y. TnArs, Feb. 26, 1995, § 3, at F8.
236. The number of new joint ventures in the United States has nearly doubled in each
of the last ten years. Jeremy Main, Making Global Alliances Work, FoRTUNE, Dec. 17,
1990, at 121, 126. One author describes joint ventures as "the competitive weapon of the
1990's." Jordan D. Lewis, Competitive Alliances Redefine Companies, 80 MGrMT. REv. 14,
14 (1991).
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fled as essential facilities. Garden variety ventures for research and
development or for the purchasing, production, or marketing of prod-
ucts do not usually possess the special characteristics that make them
essential to effective competition in the relevant market. Very few of
such ventures have monopoly power or unique cost advantages, econ-
omies of scale, or conveniences that make them impossible to dupli-
cate. Thus, in most cases, a plaintiff would not be able to rebut the
initial presumption against open access. Indeed, most network joint
ventures would not have to face the costs and risks of defending an
antitrust lawsuit because it would be clear to potential entrants that
they could not meet their initial burden of proof under the "but for"
standard.237
Conclusion
The essential facilities doctrine, conceived in an era in which
physical facilities such as railroads and utilities were dominant monop-
olies, has much relevance to the access problems raised by today's
electronic networks. Unfortunately, most courts and antitrust com-
mentators have been unable to devise an effective way of applying the
essential facilities doctrine to such networks. The rule of reason ap-
proach applied to date has complicated trials and increased uncer-
tainty over the types of access rules that can be adopted by modem
networks.
This Article proposes a new approach to network access restric-
tions that will conserve judicial resources, provide better guidance to
businesses, and adequately protect competition in network markets.
By placing the initial burden on a potential entrant to rebut a pre-
sumption against open access, this approach ensures that courts do not
overregulate networks. Under the proposed approach, courts will only
compel access to a network when it is absolutely necessary to preserve
competition in the primary market. Network members will be pro-
tected from frivolous lawsuits and, in cases that survive summary judg-
ment, will have the opportunity to present efficiency arguments
237. Potential entrants would not, for example, be likely to sue for access to the types
of buying consortiums that firms in many industries are using today to reduce their costs
for purchasing and warehousing. The Supreme Court made it clear in Northwest Stationers
that purchasing joint ventures will not ordinarily be deemed essential facilities. See supra
notes 62-66 and accompanying text. The courts are likely to conclude that a firm does not
need to access an existing buying group in order to compete effectively in the relevant
market. The barriers to the formation of such groups are not substantial, and a potential
entrant should usually be able to convince other firms to join it in forming a separate
buying group.
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against open access. In those cases in which open access is deemed
necessary, courts will be able to use their equitable powers to fashion
flexible decrees that give adequate access to potential entrants while
protecting networks from undue harm resulting from the admission of
new members. Ultimately, this approach would allow the courts to
reconcile competitors' needs for open access with networks' require-
ments for exclusivity in a manner that best promotes the welfare of
American consumers.

